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ABSTRACT 
 
Organizational Practices Leading to a Positive Safety Culture: A Delphi Approach  
 
By 
 
Andy M. Cwalina 
 
 
 
 A positive safety culture has been shown to contribute to a firm’s ability to avoid 
or reduce the occurrence of occupational accidents and injuries.  In American workplaces 
alone 3,582 people died and 5.1 million people were disabled in 2009 and the cost to 
corporate America was $169 billion and an additional productivity loss of 95 million 
work days.  The economic cost to each American household is about $1,200.  Firms that 
establish and maintain a positive safety culture are able to achieve a competitive 
advantage in the market.  
 While much research exists showing the relationship between safety culture and 
accident reduction, less guidance is found on how companies might achieve such 
improvement through cultural change.  Attempts have been made to determine the factor 
structure of safety culture, that is, the identification of the antecedents of a positive safety 
culture.  However, to date no general consensus has emerged among researchers about 
the exact elements of the factor structure.  Research methodologies have been blamed for 
biasing the research results and thereby causing the lack of consensus. This dissertation 
uses a different methodology, the Delphi method combined with Hofstede’s well-known 
onion model of organizational culture, to determine those organizational practices that 
lead to a positive safety culture.   
 Delphi is a mixed methodology that begins with an exploratory approach 
followed by the more traditional quantitative method.  The exploratory front-end was 
deemed appropriate given that prior traditional survey instruments most likely introduced 
researcher bias through a myopic view of safety culture.   Delphi also differs by utilizing 
purposeful sampling versus random sampling which provides a high level of expertise to 
inform the research. 
 After four rounds of inquiry with a panel of experts, a consensus was reached on 
18 organizational practices that lead to a positive safety culture.  This research adds to the 
understanding of safety culture, provides useful information for both practitioners and 
academic researchers, and offers launch points for extensions of the research. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Introduction to the Chapter 
 
 Occupational fatalities across the globe number 350,000 annually and the 
International Labor Organization estimates that 300,000 of those fatalities could be 
prevented by well-managed safety programs (ILO, 2011).  Such programs include the 
establishment and maintenance of an organizational culture that values accident and 
injury avoidance, i.e., a positive safety culture.  The importance of safety culture could 
not be more apparent than by the accident investigation of British Petroleum’s (BP) 
Texas City refinery explosion in 2005.  Fifteen people were killed and 180 people injured 
in that accident.  The Chemical Safety Board’s Manager of Investigations noted that 
while “BP had a low recordable injury rate by OSHA reporting standards; their safety 
culture was in shambles” (Johnson, 2010, p. 39).  OSHA fined BP $21 million for the 
accident.  However, BP’s failure to correct those safety culture issues in a timely manner 
resulted in an additional $87 million fine in 2009, just one year before the Deep Water 
Horizon drilling rig accident killed 11 people and is costing billions of dollars.  Firms that 
possess a positive safety culture are able to avoid costs associated with workers 
compensation, litigation, and productivity loss resulting in a competitive advantage in the 
market (Rechenthin, 2004).  Reason (1998) argues that a positive safety culture can, 
indeed, be engineered by adjusting those interacting elements that drive accident 
avoidance.  Understanding the nature of those “interacting elements” and how they 
influence safety culture is the essence of this study. 
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Statement of the Problem 
 The management of safety culture requires an understanding of the specific 
underlying elements of that subculture, i.e. the “factor structure” of safety culture.  This 
factor structure includes the breakdown of the manifestations of shared beliefs, values, 
and attitudes that are the antecedents to safety culture.  Research to that end began in 
earnest in the late 1970’s and the literature contains a plethora of studies aimed at 
identifying the factor structure of safety culture.  However, the results taken as a whole 
present a wide variation in the factor structure (Clarke, 2000).   In his review of the 
prominent literature, Guldenmund (2000) concluded that no general consensus of safety 
culture factor structure exists and that this variance is due primarily to context and 
methodology.   Context-driven variances generally refer to the environment under which 
the research was conducted, for example, whether the sample was drawn from the 
construction worker population versus from a manufacturing population.  Methodology 
refers to the research procedures or instruments used.  To address the problem, this 
dissertation author uses an alternative methodology, namely the Delphi methodology, and 
Hofstede’s onion model to determine factors that contribute to a positive safety culture. 
Background of the Problem 
 The term “safety culture” gained notoriety in 1986 from the investigation of the 
Chernobyl disaster.  The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) determined that a 
faulty safety culture was the root cause of the accident (Glendon & Stanton, 2000).  
Further interest in the concept emerged from formal investigations of subsequent major 
accidents (e.g., Zeebrugge ferry capsizing, Piper Alpha accident, Clapham Junction 
disaster, Bhopal disaster) in which organizational and social factors were found to be key 
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contributors to the accidents and a deficient safety culture was frequently used as an all-
encompassing explanation of such causal factors (Clarke, 2000).  Additionally, regulatory 
agencies like the United Kingdom Health and Safety Executive (HSE) and the United 
States Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) have issued directives 
and guidelines (HSE, 1997; OSHA, 2003) encouraging the development of a “positive 
safety culture” to reduce the incidence of workplace accidents and injuries.    
 In the 1940’s, Heinrich (1941) posited the idea that social and organizational 
factors influence safe behaviors. His model of accident causation asserted that human 
error, the root of all accidents, was the result of our ancestry and social environment 
(cultural factors).  In later studies, researchers reported a range of factors from two 
(Dedobbeleer & Beland, 1991) to as many as 46 factors (Lee, 1998) as the underlying 
determinants of safety culture.  In short, researchers have demonstrated that no clear 
consensus has been found for a complete factor structure.  However, evidence suggests 
that organizational practices defined under the umbrella of safety culture appear to 
influence safety behaviors. 
Purpose of the Study 
 The purpose of this study is to identify those organizational practices 
(independent variables) that lead to the establishment and maintenance of a positive 
safety culture (dependent variable).  This study differs from the previous research by 
using a mixed-methodology, namely the Delphi technique.  Reid (1988) describes the 
Delphi technique as a systematic collection and aggregation of informed judgments from 
a panel of experts on specific issues within a specific field.  As previously discussed, 
numerous quantitative studies (Barling, Loughlin, & Kelloway, 2002; Bottani, Monica, & 
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Vignali, 2009; Brown & Holmes, 1986; Gillen, Baltz, Gassel, Kirsch, & Vaccaro, 2002; 
Hofmann & Stetzer, 1998; Lee, 1998; Lee & Harrison, 2000; McFadden, Henagan & 
Gowen, 2009; and Zohar 2000, 2002a, 2002b) have been conducted to determine the 
dimensions that make up safety culture and their relationships to safety performance.  
However, Clarke (2000) notes:  “There remains no universal agreement on the definition 
of safety culture … and little theoretical underpinning for much of the empirical work” 
(p. 65).  Cooper (2000) suggests that much of the empirical confusion is indicative of a 
need to examine the safety culture construct under a wider range of context.    
By their design, the investigators who conducted the majority of these previous 
studies examined the applicable relationships of a pre-determined set of safety culture 
dimensions.  In contrast, the Delphi methodology in this dissertation study contains an 
element of exploratory research on the front-end which opens the study to previously 
unreported insights and thus eliminates the bias from a priori knowledge.  A broader 
context is more readily accommodated by using a Delphi approach.  For example, the 
panel of experts can be configured with professionals from a broader range of industries, 
thereby removing industry-specific bias that has been shown to influence the results 
(Smith, Chen, Ho, & Huang, 2006).   
Inaki, Landin, and Fa (2006) noted in their studies on quality management (QM) 
that empirical research using quantitative methods based on surveys produced results 
distorted by organizational position bias of the informants.  Managers were expected to 
conform to the “party line” with regard to QM.  Again, a purposefully configured panel 
of experts, combined with the iterative rounds in the Delphi protocol, can minimize this 
position bias.  In short, the use of a Delphi methodology for this dissertation study 
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provides an opportunity to make a unique research contribution to understanding the 
safety culture. 
Justification of the Study 
 Occupational fatalities across the globe are estimated to be 350,000 annually and, 
according to the International Labor Organization, 300,000 of those fatalities could have 
been prevented by well-managed safety programs (ILO, 2011).  In American workplaces 
alone 3,582 people died and 5.1 million people were disabled in 2009 (NSC, 2011).  The 
National Safety Council estimates these accidents cost corporate America $169 billion 
and an additional productivity loss of 95 million work days (NSC, 2011).  The economic 
cost is about $1,200 to each American household (NSC, 2011).  Clearly, firms that 
establish and maintain a positive safety culture that supports the reduction or elimination 
of occupational accidents and injuries are able to achieve a competitive advantage in the 
market (Rechenthin, 2004).  Clarke (1999) points out that “while some research evidence 
suggests that a positive safety culture will improve safety performance, there is less 
guidance on how companies might achieve such improvement through cultural change” 
(p. 186).  Reason (1998) argues that a positive safety culture can, indeed, be engineered:   
Achieving a safe culture does not have to be akin to a religious conversion – as it 
is sometimes represented.  There is nothing mystical about it.  It can be acquired 
through the day-to-day application of practical down-to-earth measures.  Nor is 
safety culture a single entity.  It is made up of a number of interacting elements, 
or ways of doing, thinking, and managing, that have enhanced resistance to 
operational dangers as their natural by-product. (p. 305) 
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Understanding the nature of those “interacting elements” and how they influence safety 
culture is the essence of this dissertation. 
Applicable Theoretical Model 
 Hofstede’s (2001) “onion” model of cultural manifestations will be used as the 
theoretical lens in this study to examine the practices that support a positive safety 
culture.  Hofstede’s model, which is based upon the works of mid-twentieth century 
anthropologists and sociologists, posits that shared values are at the core of 
organizational cultures.  Hofstede further notes that values are not directly observable but 
rather manifest themselves outwardly through the organization’s practices, namely 
rituals, symbols, and heroes.  He likens these practices to individual layers of an onion, 
concentrically wrapped around values at the core.  Figure 1 depicts the onion model 
graphically, where rituals, symbols, and heroes are the practices that manifest the core 
values of the organization.  As the onion model is applied in this dissertation study, the 
core organizational culture is safety culture and the surrounding layers are the 
manifestations, or practices, that are identified in this study. 
Research Questions  
The statement of the problem noted that occupational accidents can be reduced by 
the establishment of a positive safety culture and that certain organizational practices are 
related to the establishment of safety culture.  Therefore, the following questions are 
pertinent to addressing the problem stated for this dissertation; 
 Question #1:  What practices are used by the members of organizations to 
establish or maintain a positive safety culture within those organizations?  
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Question #2:  Does consensus exist among a panel of safety experts for the set, or 
subset, of the practices discovered by the first research question? 
Definition of Terms 
Organizational culture:  “A pattern of shared basic assumptions learned by a 
group as it solved its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, which has 
worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members 
as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems” (Schein, 
2010, p. 18).  
Subculture:  The fraction of the organizational culture that is defined by a specific 
assumption or specific set of assumptions aimed at solving a specific problem of 
adaptation and integration (Schein, 2009, 2010). 
Safety Culture:  “The shared attitudes, values, beliefs, and practices of people at 
work concerning not only the magnitude of the risks that they encounter but also the 
necessity, practicality, and effectiveness of preventive measures” (Booth, 1996, p. 313). 
Safety Program:  The systematic set of physical and organizational controls used 
to intervene in the accident causation process and to break the causation chain (Bottani, 
Monica & Vignali, 2009). 
Delphi Method:  A process to achieve a consensus opinion among knowledgeable 
respondents through repetitive and iterative inquiries (Dressel, Consoli, Kim, & 
Atkinson, 2007).  These knowledgeable respondents comprise the “panel of experts” that 
is queried on three or more separate instances.  Each inquiry reiterates the results of the 
previous inquiry such that a subsequent response of the panel converges on consensus 
results.   
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Practices:  Following Hofstede (2001), practices are subdivided into: symbols, 
heroes, and rituals.  Symbols are the words, gestures, pictures, and objects that carry the 
meanings of the culture and are recognized only by those who share the culture.  Heroes 
are persons, alive or dead, real or imaginary, who outwardly possess the characteristics 
that are highly prized by those who share the culture.  Rituals are the collective activities 
that are technically unnecessary for achievement of the organization’s goals, but are 
considered socially essential by those who share the culture.  
Onion Model:  Hofstede’s (2001) pictorial representation of culture’s observable 
manifestations.  At the core of culture are the shared values with the organizational 
practices, namely the rituals, heroes, and symbols that surround the core values like the 
layers of an onion.  Figure 1 illustrates Hofstede’s (2001) Onion Model. 
Delimitations 
 The following areas and discussion of each defines the boundaries of the research 
included in this dissertation. 
 Work Setting Risk.  Panel experts were selected from organizations that have been 
deemed to have sufficient risk to warrant a formalized occupational safety program 
specified by the firm.  Accidents can, however, occur in any work setting, but certain 
work contexts make formalized safety programs impractical or unreasonable.  For 
example, telecommuters, sales representatives, and similar remote workers may not 
interact sufficiently with their corporate peers to establish a safety culture, or at least a 
shared set of values regarding safety.   
Similarly, many jobs do not inherently entail enough risk to warrant a formalized 
safety program.  Data processors are subjected to much less risk and sustain far fewer 
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injuries than construction workers.  Consequently, data processors are frequently not 
included in rigorous safety programs.  Therefore, job settings with low safety risk are not 
specifically included in this study.  
 Industry differentiation.  Hazards differ according to industry type.  In this 
dissertation study, no attempt was made to drill down and delineate industry specific 
practices.  For example, prior safety culture research demonstrated that the practice of 
hazard training is an antecedent to positive safety culture (Fang et al., 2006; Farington-
Darby et al., 2005; Silva et al, 2004).  However, the content and frequency of the training 
can differ significantly according to the uniqueness of the job hazards.  In this 
dissertation study, I address the broader category of training and exclude job or industry 
specifics.  Other organizational practices identified by this research are similarly limited 
to the same broader categories.  
 Background of Delphi Panel Experts.  Panel members originate from four groups 
of people: (a) principal corporate officers, i.e., CEO, COO, presidents, and equivalent, (b) 
safety professionals, (c) auditors or inspectors, and (d) external consultants.  These 
groups were selected because they most likely possess a wide cross-sectional view of the 
organization.  Positions with narrower views, such as shop floor operators or trades 
specialists, have been excluded.  Consequently, job specifics within the firm are not 
examined. 
Assumptions 
 The concepts of safety climate and safety culture are assumed to be 
interchangeable when the ultimate outcome is accident avoidance.  While the literature 
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does contain arguments for separateness, an equal number of precedent cases exist within 
the same literature for interchangeability. 
Chapter I Conclusion 
 Management practitioners can improve organizational safety performance 
(accident and injury reduction) by instilling and maintaining a positive safety culture.   
Researchers have demonstrated that the foundational elements of safety culture (the 
antecedents) vary widely depending on the context and methodology of the study.  
Hofstede’s (2001) Onion Model provides a theoretical base from which organizational 
practices can be viewed as the manifestations of safety culture and serve as the proxy to 
measure its existence.  Also, in this dissertation, the Delphi technique was used as a 
methodological alternative to traditional survey instruments organizational and contextual 
bias is minimized.  These biases are thought to be major contributors to the lack of 
consensus of the factor structure in prior published research. 
Organization of the Remainder of the Dissertation  
 The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows:  In Chapter II, a review 
of the literature is provided that examines the Hofstede Onion Model, accident 
prevention, safety culture and its factor structure, and the Delphi methodology; in 
Chapter III the Delphi research methodology, the expert panel, the rounds of inquiry, and 
the research design are discussed;  Chapter IV provides a summary presentation of the 
data and an analysis thereof; and Chapter V provides a discussion of the results, 
conclusions, implications for practitioners, limitations, and extensions for further 
research. 
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Figure 1:  Hofstede’s (2001) Onion Model showing the manifestations of culture as they 
are related to core values.  Adapted from Culture’s Consequences: Comparing Values, 
Behaviors, Institutions, and Organizations across Nations (p. 11), by G. Hofstede, 2001, 
Thousand Oaks, CA:  Sage.  Copyright 2001 by Geert Hofstede. 
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CHAPTER II  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Introduction to the Chapter 
The objective of this chapter is to examine the existing research on organizational 
culture, safety culture, the practical application of safety culture to avoid injuries and 
accidents, the measurements of safety culture, and the Delphi methodology.  Five streams 
of literature are reviewed: (a) the literature that leads to the selection of Hofstede’s onion 
model of culture as the theoretical basis for this study and the onion model broken down 
into the elements that manifest culture; (b) the body of literature that supports the 
existence of an organizational subculture commonly called safety culture; (c) the body of 
literature supporting the positive correlation between safety culture and safety 
performance; (d) the body of literature that contains the analyses of the social and 
organizational elements that comprise the structure of safety culture and the lack of 
consensus on that structure; and (e) the final literature stream in which research 
methodologies are compared, and more specifically, the application of the Delphi 
technique. 
Culture and Hofstede’s Onion Model 
 The survival of mankind thus far has, to a large extent, depended on the ability of 
individual people to act together as a social unit or organization.  Social scientists 
Meyerson and Martin (1987) place those abilities, and their underlying elements, under 
the umbrella of the culture of an organization. They called it “the social or normative glue 
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that holds together a potentially diverse group of organizational members” (p. 623).   
Organizational culture research has a long history with researchers producing a number 
of definitions for culture.  Some prominent examples include Deal and Kennedy (1982) 
who used the definition as norms, values, and beliefs of the group.  Moran and Volkwein 
(1992) defined culture as an “ideational system focused on the patterns of meaning 
represented through values, norms, formal knowledge, beliefs, and expressive forms” (p. 
33).  O’Reilly and Chatman (1996), whose definition of culture is consistent with Kotter 
and Heskett (1992) and with Rousseau (1990), conceptualize it as a “system of shared 
values (that define what is important) and norms that define appropriate attitudes and 
behaviors for organizational members (how to feel and behave)” (p. 160).   Schein’s 
(1990) definition states that culture is “a pattern of shared basic assumptions that the 
group has learned as it solved problems of external adaptation and internal integration, 
that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new 
members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems” (p. 
111).  These more frequently cited definitions, and the many others in the literature, share 
some common threads. The most common is that “values” are at the core of culture, and 
they are “shared” by the members.  Even Schein (2009), who did not include values in his 
initial definition, points out later in his writings that values are derived from the tacit 
assumptions used in his definition of culture.  
 Hofstede’s (2001) onion model of culture has the concept of values at its core, 
with three observable manifestations of culture (symbols, heroes, and rituals) surrounding 
values like layers of an onion (see Figure 1).  Symbols are “words, gestures, pictures, and 
objects that carry complex meanings recognized uniquely by the members of the culture” 
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(Hofstede, 2001, p. 11).  Heroes are “persons, alive or dead, real or imaginary, who are 
highly prized by the members of the culture and serve as behavioral models” (Hofstede, 
2001, p. 11).   Rituals are the “collective activities which may not be technically essential 
to the desired goals but are considered socially essential by the members of the culture” 
(Hofstede, 2001, p. 11).   Hofstede (2001) subsumes these three observable 
manifestations under the term “practices.”  He posits that at the core of culture, values are 
invisible until they are observed through overt practices. 
 Safety culture researchers have made extensive use of the Hofstede onion model.  
In their analysis of the development of safety culture, McDonald and Ryan (1992) noted 
that employees do not act in a vacuum but exercise the practices of the safety culture to 
which they belong.  In his work on organizational adoption of lessons learned from 
serious accidents, Reason (1998) suggests that Hofstede’s onion model best illustrates 
how a safety culture can be engineered via regimented practices aimed at goal behavior.  
Mearns, Flin, Gordon, and Fleming (1998) studied safety cultures of off-shore oil rigs 
and used the practices described by the Hofstede onion model as variables that 
differentiated strategic versus tactical management of safety culture. They concluded that 
senior management (strategists) was more involved with “symbols” and “rituals” while 
the work force (the tacticians) placed more importance on their immediate supervisors, 
the “heroes.”   Cooper (2000) posited a model for future safety culture research using 
Bandura’s Social Cognitive Theory that relied heavily on the layered approach, 
frequently citing Hofstede’s onion model.  In his analysis of making changes 
(strengthening) to safety culture, DeJoy (2005) points to Hofstede’s onion model to 
illustrate how the manifestations of culture are the most accessible structural elements 
15 
 
that can be adjusted for the purpose of modifying the safety culture.  Finally, 
Guldenmund (2000) analyzed 20 years of safety culture research literature to conclude  
that a broad consensus existed among the authors about using Hofstede’s multi-layered 
concentric model of safety culture to justify safety culture’s influences and consequences. 
 Safety Culture 
History 
 A brief literature review of the evolutionary history of occupational safety is 
appropriate as a prelude to the discussion of safety culture.  Allen and Ritzel (1996) point 
out that in the Pentateuch (the initial five books of the Western Bible), written between 
1500 BC and 1400 BC, Moses directed the establishment of three separate cities of 
refuge.  This action suggested an attempt to avoid fatalities and improve survival by 
providing “redundancy,” a common modern engineering approach to hazardous 
consequence mitigation.  Gaius Plinius Secundus, a.k.a. Pliny the Elder, a philosopher 
and student of rhetoric, precautioned miners in about 50 AD to wear a veil over their 
faces to guard against breathing airborne dust (Allen & Ritzel, 1996).  While curiously 
interesting, this early evidence of concern for worker safety is at best anecdotal and more 
likely reflects a purpose other than a business-oriented motivation for occupational 
safety.   
 Interest in the welfare of workers was seeded in the 1700’s by the Industrial 
Revolution which brought about a new class of industrial workers who were being 
uprooted from their agrarian lifestyles.  The supply of labor for this new labor-intensive 
environment was either short or sporadic due to the changing nature of employment 
(Wren, 2005).  These workers had difficulty leaving the farm to work in crowded, 
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monotonous, and demanding factory environments.  They frequently worked only the 
days needed to earn just enough pay to get them through the week, then remained absent 
until the next week or until the family needed more money.  Factory owners found 
themselves continuously scrambling for productive labor.  Those entrepreneurs who 
struggled to assemble a stable and reliable work force certainly did not want to lose them 
to job-related injuries.  After arriving in the USA, E. I. du Pont recognized this need and 
posted safety rules at his gunpowder mills on the Brandywine River in Delaware.  He 
cautioned employees that adherence to the rules was a condition of employment (DuPont, 
1952).  In Europe, Frederick the Great of Prussia, King Louis XVI, and Napoleon all 
established safety rules and inspections systems for miners (Allen & Ritzel, 1996) 
especially after the deployment of the Newcomen steam pump that significantly 
increased mine output (Wren, 2005).  These were examples of individualized 
entrepreneurial efforts to promulgate workplace safety.  The first significant institutional 
effort occurred in England in 1833 during the period of rapid industrialization, when the 
first laws governing industrial safety were passed.  In the United States, after the 
conclusion of the civil war, Massachusetts passed laws in 1867 governing factory 
inspections and in 1877 required mechanical guards on rotating machinery (Hale & 
Hovden 1998).   
 These examples of the beginnings of occupational safety concern initiated what 
Hale and Hovden (1998) describe as distinct “eras” of management approaches to the 
problem.  The beginning of each era is attributed to a specific hallmark in business or the 
social and behavioral sciences, but none of these eras has a clear endpoint.  Nevertheless, 
the priorities in management thought clearly changes from one era to the next. 
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 The engineered safeguards era began in the late 1800’s as several states passed 
laws regarding occupational safety.  The prevailing management thought during this era 
was that accidents were unpreventable and that safety emphasis would be placed on 
mitigating the consequences and compensation for the widows (Eastman, 1911).  The 
engineered safeguards approach employed devices designed by engineers to keep 
workers out of harm’s way.  Typical devices included mechanical guards, energy relief 
devices (e.g., fuses, pressure-relief valves, and rupture discs), physical barriers (e.g., 
walls, banisters, and handrails), and personal protective equipment (e.g., air masks, safety 
glasses, ear plugs, dead man controls, and limit switches).  These devices were intended 
to either separate the worker from dangerous energy and conditions or make it more 
difficult for the workers to put themselves into hazardous situations. 
 Meehan (1995) notes that engineered safeguards were an inevitable first approach 
during the 1800’s when the rapid pace of industrialization and mechanization frequently 
overwhelmed the ill-prepared workers.  They were already having difficulty with 
transitioning to the overcrowded factory environment and could only cope with a passive 
approach to safety. 
 Eastman (1911) notes that not all factories were equipped with engineered 
safeguards during this era.  She points out that, while many laws required firms to 
provide a safe workplace, enforcement of these laws was minimal.  Further, no 
requirements were in place for investigating accidents and reporting or maintaining safety 
statistics or data for performance evaluation.  Eastman (1911) cites an example in 1909 
where seven New York firms were prosecuted for violating accident prevention laws, but 
only two of those firms were fined a total of $35.  While the institution of engineering 
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safeguards improved safety performance, the inability or unwillingness to establish the 
approach set the stage for transitioning to a new era that demanded changes in 
organizational cultures. 
 The safety culture era was ushered in with the publication of Heinrich’s (1931) 
book, Industrial Accident Prevention.  It was based on the analysis of thousands of 
accidents and the application of general management principles (Heinrich, 1941).  He 
concluded that most accidents were preventable, which was in stark contrast to the 
management thought of the previous era.  Heinrich viewed safety through a social 
organization paradigm in contrast to a technical view.  It is this paradigmatic shift that 
demarcates the transition between eras.  Engineered safeguards continued to be invented, 
engineered, and deployed, even to the present day.  However, managements’ thoughts 
were redirected toward the human side of accident prevention. 
 Heinrich (1941) posited the “domino model” for accident causation.  He 
suggested that a series of connected evolutions/events, like dominos pushing one over 
after the other, led to a fatality or serious injury.  He asserted that an injury or fatality, the 
fifth domino, is caused by an accident, the fourth domino, which in turn is caused by an 
unsafe act or unsafe condition, the third domino.  He further asserts that the commission 
of an unsafe act, or setup of an unsafe condition, is the result of human error, the second 
domino, and that human error is caused by our ancestral culture or social environment, 
the first domino.  Heinrich (1941) proposed that management thought should be focused 
on intervening between the first, second, and third dominos rather than between the 
fourth and fifth as was done in the previous era.  This new focus ultimately brought about 
the concept of safety culture. 
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 This new approach had a historic dark side.  Because occupational safety 
legislation was weak and resided at the state level, an injured worker was required to sue 
the employer to establish fault and obtain compensation (Allen & Ritzel, 1996).  
However, upon close examination of the domino model, one might conclude that 
accidents are completely attributable to the worker’s beliefs, attitudes, and actions and 
that management bears no causal responsibility for accidents or injuries.  In the early 
development of this model, it was not uncommon for management to take this approach 
(Brown, Prussia, & Willis, 2003; Peters, 1986) and shirk accountability for injuries.  
Unions attempted to reverse this logic by including safety in their bargaining portfolio 
(Della-Giustina & Della-Giustina, 1992).  However, the union approach backfired when 
some legal circles deemed that safety was perhaps the unions’ responsibility (Della-
Giustina & Della-Giustina, 1992; Hodson & Spigener, 1997).  Had this paradigm been 
allowed to continue, management practices may never have evolved to a point where 
management takes ownership of the safety culture and plays a significant role in 
occupational safety.  It took until the late 1900’s with the passage of the Occupation 
Safety and Health Act (OSHA) at the federal level to dispel this employer-worker 
controversy (Safety, 2007).  
 
The Culture 
 Safety culture is best understood as a subset of the more general concept of 
organizational culture (Mohamed, 2003).  The definition of organizational culture varies 
widely depending on the field of study from which it historically evolved.  For example, 
researchers studying the disciplines of psychology, sociology, and social anthropology all 
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provide theoretical, epistemological, and methodological approaches to culture with 
differing ontologies.    According to Ashkanasy, Wilderom, and Peterson (2000) culture 
is reflected by three different ontologies: (a) structural realism is where an organization 
exists as a structure and culture is a property of that structure; (b) social construction 
emphasizes the regularity of events, of which a subset of events is grouped together into a 
culture; and (c) linguistic conveniences is where organizational attributes, including 
culture, serves heuristic purposes of helping members think and reason.  In his seminal 
work on organizational culture, Schein (1990) simplifies this second ontology of social 
construction as “the way we do things around here,” i.e. the organizational practices.  In 
this dissertation study, the author applies the second ontology for which the regularity of 
events can be equated with established organizational practice and, more specifically, 
those organizational practices linked to establishing and reinforcing a positive safety 
culture. 
 The goal of a positive safety culture is the elimination of accidents (Clarke, 2006). 
Accident causation attributed to the socio-technical elements of culture was explored as 
early as the mid-twentieth century.  However, the term safety culture was most notably 
popularized in the 1980’s by the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) 
investigation of the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power station in the Ukraine.  The 
often-cited IAEA definition of safety culture is “that assembly of characteristics and 
attitudes in organizations and individuals which establish that, as an overriding priority, 
safety issues receive the attention warranted by their significance” (Cooper, 2000, p. 
113).   The Advisory Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations (ACSNI) working 
in parallel to the IAEA defines safety culture as “the product of individual and group 
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values, attitudes, perceptions, competencies, and behaviors that determine the 
commitment to, and the style and proficiency of, an organization’s health and safety 
management” (HSC, 1993, p. 23).  Outside the realm of the nuclear industry, Clarke 
(2000) notes that “safety culture might simply be understood as putting safety first.  
However, this core assumption will be revealed in the way that organizational tasks are 
carried out” (p. 75). 
 Prior to the definitions set forth by the IAEA, behavioral safety studies driven by 
socio-technical elements came under the nomenclature of either safety climate or safety 
culture.  Since the middle of the twentieth century, researchers have carried on a vigorous 
debate in the literature about whether safety climate and safety culture are distinctly 
different concepts.  These debates derive motivation from a similar ongoing debate in the 
sociology literature regarding organizational climate and organizational culture.   
Where the literature contains discussion about safety climate and safety culture 
separately, it is clear the two concepts are strongly related.  Cheyne, Cox, Oliver, and 
Thomas (1998), in their discussion of safety climate and culture, conclude that “[safety] 
climate can be viewed as a temporal state measure of [safety] culture” (p. 256).  In fact, 
Cox and Flin (1998) state that for the outcome of safe behavior, the two concepts are 
indistinguishable.  More recently, Choudry, Fang, and Mohamed (2007) tested a model 
that accounts for safety climate and safety culture as simply two elements in the same 
model such that measurements of either produce the same outcome.  Arboleda, Morrow, 
Crum, and Shelley (2003) and Back and Woolfson (1999) used the two terms 
interchangeably, while Bottani, Monica, and Vignali (2009), Cadieux, Roy, and Desmaris 
(2006), and Cardar and Ragan (2003) replaced the interchanged term with “safety 
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system” or “occupational health and safety”.  In keeping with the more contemporary 
scholars from the literature, no distinction between safety climate and safety culture is 
made in this dissertation study.  
Safety Culture and Accident Prevention  
 According to Schein (1990), organizational culture produces a specific way the 
organization perceives, thinks, feels, and behaves about safety.  According to Heinrich 
(1941), unsafe behavior is the antecedent to accidents.  It follows then that a good safety 
culture that promotes safe behaviors will result in fewer accidents.  Research has 
demonstrated that organizational safety culture has a significant positive relationship with 
accident involvement across a range of industrial settings, such as chemical and nuclear 
(Hofmann & Stetzer, 1998; Lee, 1998, Lee & Harrison, 2000), manufacturing (Brown & 
Holmes, 1986; Zohar 2000, 2002a, 2002b), construction (Gillen, Baltz, Gassel, Kirsch, & 
Vaccaro, 2002), the health care industry (McFadden, Henagan & Gowen, 2009), and the 
service industry (Barling, Loughlin, & Kelloway, 2002).  Most recently, Bottani, Monica, 
and Vignali (2009) showed a clear difference in accident prevention results between 
adopters and non-adopters of safety management efforts.  Clarke (2006) summed up this 
research in a meta-analytic review of 35 published studies.  He found support for the 
contention that improving safety climate/culture will have a significant effect in the 
enhancement of employee safety performance, accident prevention, and a reduction in 
occupational accidents and injuries. 
The Factor Structure of Safety Culture 
 The concept of safety culture, or the idea that social and organizational factors 
influence safe behaviors, was first posited by Heinrich (1941) with his “domino” model 
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of accident causation.  In his study of social and organizational factors that contribute to 
safety performance, Cohen (1977) found seven elements: management commitment, 
management-worker interaction, workforce stability, industrial relations, housekeeping, 
training, and conventional safety practices.  Zohar (1980) tested a similar model and 
found eight key factors to relate safety performance: management attitudes, training, 
effects of safe conduct on promotion, effects of safe conduct on social status, level of 
risk, work pace, status of safety officer, and status of safety committee.  However, Brown 
and Holmes (1986) questioned the psychometric validity and generalizability of Zohar’s 
(1980) results because the research had not undergone the recommended replication and 
because it had been confined to an Israeli sample.  After expanding the sample context 
and accounting for post-traumatic (accident involved) and pre-traumatic (no accident 
involvement), Brown and Holmes (1986) used confirmatory factor analyses to find 
support for only three of the eight dimensions in Zohar’s (1980) model.   
Dedobbeleer and Beland (1991) attempted to repeat the work of Brown and 
Holmes (1986) using a sample of construction workers, but found support for only two of 
the three dimensions found by Brown and Holmes (1986).  They attribute the difference 
mainly to methodological issues, i.e., use of weighted least squares versus maximum 
likelihood.  Dedobbeleer and Beland (1991) made no discussion of differences that might 
be attributable to sample contexts.   Diaz and Cabrera (1997) used Zohar’s (1980) 
approach with a study group of Spanish airport workers and found six factors versus 
Zohar’s (1980) eight.  Diaz and Cabrera (1997) further noted that the significance of the 
six factors varied depending on the specific job at the airports (e.g., fuel handlers versus 
ramp workers). They noted that attitudes toward safety procedure compliance differed 
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with job situational factors (e.g., work hours, age, and risk).  Mearns, Flin, Fleming, and 
Gordon (1998) studied the safety culture factor structure of workers on off-shore oil 
platforms and found nine factors of significance. However, they found a wide variety of 
factors across specific job contexts and suggested that different jobs may be responsible 
for varying “safety subcultures.”  Certain jobs supported only four significant factors 
while others supported all nine.  Examples of differences in job context included parent 
employer, supervisory status, length of service, type of work (caterer versus deck-hand) 
to name a few.   Hayes, Perander, Smecko, and Trask (1998) argued that the reason for 
these variations of factor structure was that only a limited component of the work safety 
domain was sampled.  Researchers later employed wider ranges of context and still 
reported a large variance in factor structures (Fang, Chen, & Wong, 2006; Fernandez-
Muniz, Montes-Peon, & Vazquez-Ordas, 2007; Silva, Lima, & Baptista, 2004; 
Wahlstrom, 2001).    
These examples of researchers reporting a wide variation in the factor structure of 
the safety culture led Clarke (2000) and Cooper (2000) to conclude no general consensus 
exists about the factor structure of safety culture.  They did, however, observe some 
difficulties with the methodology that contribute to the lack of consensus.  Specifically, 
Cooper (2000) noted that the continued use of quantitative survey instruments that are 
nearly alike may be a key contributor to the consensus problem.  Cooper (2000) discusses 
the concept of reciprocal determinism for Social Learning Theory and posits that learned 
behaviors get modified over time as each employee increases self-efficacy.  Hence, the 
learned safety behaviors (the organizational practices aimed at safety) get modified over 
time and especially on an individual basis.  Therefore, researchers making exclusive use 
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of surveys might only be testing their a priori assumptions about safety behaviors on a 
sample that is still modifying those behaviors. Contributing to the same line of reasoning, 
Cox and Flin (1998) noted that the survey instruments being used by most quantitative 
research on safety culture are based on Zohar’s (1980) original safety climate survey with 
only modifications for specific contexts.  Thus, not only has the use of a quantitative 
survey instrument biased the respondents toward the a priori knowledge of the researcher, 
the a priori knowledge may have been fixed in time by continually building the 
instrument upon the Zohar (1980) questionnaire.  The result is that prior researchers’ a 
priori assumptions built into the survey instruments for factor structure may contain a 
series of gaps in the substantive knowledge about the antecedents of safety culture.  
Clarke (1999) implied this gap issue when she reported that “intergroup biases” caused 
by differing perceptions of the safety values under different working conditions within 
the same firm were responsible for the variation among different research studies.   
Clarke (2000) later suggested that qualitative methods, rather than survey methodology, 
might have been useful for resolving intergroup bias, but because of the time and cost 
involved, the methodology was ignored. 
In this dissertation, the Delphi mixed-methodology is used with an initial 
qualitative inquiry as recommended by Clarke (2000), followed by a series of 
quantitative inquires.  The initial qualitative inquiry is exploratory in nature and is 
intended to discover the wider breadth of the social and organizational factors that 
influence a positive safety culture.  It is followed by more quantitative inquiries aimed at 
concentrating the initial discoveries toward a consensus of most important.  The 
exploratory approach, i.e., open-endedness of the first inquiry, is intended to gain the 
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maximum understanding of the range of possible factors and minimize biases induced by 
assumptions of this researcher (Ray & Sahu, 1990).  Linstone and Turoff (2002) describe 
the Delphi methodology as a useful technique for “re-definition of problem attributes or 
solution opportunities” which directly applies to the problem under study by this 
dissertation. 
 In contrast to random sampling, the Delphi also requires purposeful sampling, 
i.e., the study respondents are selected for their demonstrated expertise.  Delbecq, Van de 
Ven, & Gustafson (1975) describes these expert participants as those with “a deep 
understanding in the problem and experience to share” and Duffield (1993) as 
“representative of their profession or professional organization.”  For this dissertation, the 
selected respondents’ knowledge, skills, and experience with occupational safety bring a 
much wider discovery of potential factors that relate to safety culture.  In short, the 
exploratory front-end and the purposeful sampling associated with the Delphi 
methodology has provided significant potential to compensate for the shortcomings 
experienced by previous research 
As discussed, Clarke (2000) recommended a qualitative approach as an 
alternative to the overused survey questionnaires.  However, she did not specifically 
recommend a Delphi methodology.  Five other traditions of qualitative inquiry (Creswell, 
1998) have been examined as potential alternatives: (a) biography, (b) phenomenology, 
(c) grounded theory, (d) ethnography, and (e) case study.  All are exploratory in nature.   
However, because of the small sample focus, all but the phenomenology would have 
limited generalizability.  Polkinghorne (1989) gives example of phenomenological 
studies with the number of informants ranging from five to 25 which might appear to be 
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adequate for this study.  Creswell (1998) notes, however, that it is essential that the 
selected informants have experienced the phenomena being studied.  In this case, safety 
culture would be the phenomena, and ensuring informant experience may present some 
difficulty.  Additionally, the phenomenology taken in its purest form is not usually 
intended for exploring relationships (e.g., organizational practices to safety culture), but 
rather studies the concept of how people experience the phenomena (Creswell, 1998).  In 
short, it appears the Delphi methodology offers the most promise. 
The Delphi Method 
 As part of the cold war defense research in the 1950’s, the US Air Force 
contracted the Rand Corporation to conduct a study using expert opinion to determine the 
optimal US industrial system target from a Soviet strategic planning view that required 
the fewest A-bomb munitions.  This study, including the methodology used, was called 
“Project Delphi,” hence the origin of the method’s name (Dalkey & Helmer, 1963).  
Alternative approaches to handling this problem at that time would have required data 
collection from multiple intelligence channels, most of which individually were 
considered to be sufficiently biased to dominate the simulation model.  
 Because of the classified nature of the originating study, it took until the late 
1960’s for Delphi to gain the attention of researchers outside the defense community.  
Because of the rapid pace of aerospace and electronics development at that time, Delphi 
became the methodology of choice for technological forecasting and justification of large 
expenditures, especially in the aerospace and defense industries.  Traditional researchers 
unfamiliar with Delphi applications might have an image that Delphi is limited to 
forecasting.  However, during the last quarter-century, thousands of research studies 
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using Delphi methodologies have been conducted in diverse disciplines such as 
operations, management science, environment, transportation, health, and other social 
sciences (Linstone & Turoff, 2002).  Objectives have grown beyond forecasting to 
studying problems that do not lend themselves to precise analytical techniques or to 
problems that are readily susceptible to sample biases (Linstone & Turoff, 2002).   Some 
of the more prominent examples of non-forecasting research using Delphi are included in 
the following discussion. 
 Jung-Erceg, Pandza, Armbruster, and Dreher (2007) conducted a study to 
determine the absorptive capacity of manufacturing firms in Europe.  Absorptive capacity 
is a firm’s capability to assimilate external knowledge for the purpose of increasing the 
firm’s innovativeness.  Absorptive capacity was thought to be a function of the firm’s 
existing stock of knowledge and the firm’s diversity of expertise, experience, and culture.  
Because these variables are highly dynamic, contextually based, and difficult to 
operationalize, analysis by traditional quantitative methods would not be practical.  In 
particular, Jung-Erceg et al. (2007) noted that it was unlikely that a simple random 
sample would adequately include all the contexts, diversity, and dynamics of the 
variables, and just as unlikely to facilitate convergence of the results.  Jung-Erceg et al. 
(2007) concluded that an initial exploratory approach was necessary and turned to a 
Delphi methodology with its purposeful sampling and iterative inquiry.  They assembled 
a panel of experts that deliberately cut across gender, age, occupation, knowledge, skills, 
and other essential characteristics to ensure completeness for informing the research.  The 
initial inquiry of the panel produced a large number (101) of wide ranging responses, and 
by the iterative Delphi procedure, narrowed it down to eight as the most important.  Thus, 
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Jung-Erceg et al. (2007) successfully used a Delphi methodology to research a problem 
with a somewhat fuzzy set of independent variables.  It is for reasons very similar to the 
Jung-Erceg et al. (2007) research study that Delphi methodology has been used for this 
dissertation study.   For this study, the lack of general consensus regarding the factor 
structure of safety culture in the existing research indicates a need for an initial 
exploratory approach by a panel of experts that will span the different paradigms through 
which safety culture is observed.  
 Another example is Dressel, Consoli, Kim, and Atkinson (2007) study to identify 
the successful and unsuccessful practices used by university counseling center 
supervisors for multicultural supervision.  Multicultural supervision was defined as a 
supervisory situation where the individuals in the supervisory-subordinate dyad differed 
in their ethnicity.  Because no set of best practices for multicultural contexts existed, and 
because the range of cultures was considerably diverse, Dressel et al. (2007) recognized 
the need for exploratory research coupled with a purposefully selected sample that 
covered the diverse range of cultures.   They successfully employed a Delphi 
methodology to initially discover 141 practices which later converged into 35 most 
important practices by the final round.  Again a parallel can be drawn between the 
Dressel et al. (2007) research and this study.  In this dissertation, the lack of a consensus 
group of practices related to safety culture is similar to the absences of a set of best 
practices for the Dressel et al. (2007) research.   
 Croom (2000) used a Delphi approach to identify the web-based procurement 
practices that led to successful maintenance, repair, and operating supply management.  
The rapidly evolving technology of web-based procurement had not facilitated the 
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development of a reliable set of practices from which a survey instrument could be 
constructed.   The exploratory nature of Delphi facilitated Croom’s (2000) first-ever 
identification of a set of practices and the purposeful sampling, in contrast to random 
sampling, ensured the full spectrum of end users was included.  The parallel that is drawn 
between the works of Dressel et al. (2007), Croom (2000), and this dissertation research 
is that no consistent set of antecedent factors exist. 
 Boynton (2006) conducted a study to identify those professional values that were 
key to ethical decision-making by public relations practitioners.  Boynton (2006) 
challenged the ethics code of the Public Relations Society of America (PRSA), which at 
the time had been in its eighth iteration and was thought to be out-of-date and biased by 
its self-primacy.  For these reasons, Boynton (2006) selected the Delphi methodology 
because of an exploratory front-end not available with traditional survey instruments.  
For the initial Delphi round a single open-ended question was used:  “What values do you 
deem most important for public relations practitioners to employ in their jobs?” (p. 326).  
After three rounds the results of the study affirmed the existing six core values found in 
the PRSA code and added two more.  For this dissertation study of safety culture, the 
same bias stemming from self-primacy as found in Boynton’s (2006) research problem is 
thought to be one of the reasons for the lack of general consensus of the factor structure 
of safety culture.     
In their study of the effect of quality management (QM) on corporate 
performance, Saizarbitoria, Landin, and Fa (2006) found that most of the traditionally 
used quantitative surveys were specifically aimed at managers assigned to the quality 
control function and introduced a bias by ignoring the diversity of the management team.  
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To avoid this distortion, Saizarbitoria et al (2006) used a Delphi methodology with its 
exploratory inquiry and purposeful sampling to inform the research with opinions of a 
wide range of experts having a variety of functions in the implementation of the QM 
models.  In this dissertation research, participants were purposefully selected from four 
diverse groups (upper-level managers, safety professionals, consultants, and 
auditor/inspectors) to avoid the distortional bias that Saizarbitoria et al (2006) 
encountered with traditional survey methodologies.  
The aforementioned examples of research illustrate how the purposeful sampling 
aspect (panel of expert participants) of the Delphi methodology was used to compensate 
for unique biases introduced by context and self-primacy.  Both of the same types of 
biases have confounded the previous safety culture research, which is the subject of this 
dissertation study.  The examples also illustrate how the exploratory nature of the first 
round of inquiry of a Delphi methodology is useful for studies which have complex or 
poorly defined dependent variables.  In the case of this safety culture research, the lack of 
general consensus on factor structure is indicative of complexity and/or poor definition of 
the input variables.  The author of this dissertation concludes that choice of the Delphi 
methodological design for researching the organizational practices related to safety 
culture is well-supported by the literature. 
Chapter II Conclusion 
 The review of the literature presented in this dissertation study revealed that 
culture of an organization can be modeled with shared values at the core that are 
manifested through observable organizational practices surrounding the core and 
reinforcing specific individual behaviors.  Safety culture, a subset or subculture of 
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organizational culture, can be expected to be manifested through a set of safety-specific 
practices that ultimately lead to safe behavior by the individuals and ultimately accident 
reduction.  To manage safety culture effectively requires an understanding of the factor 
structure or antecedents and, although the literature contains a plethora of studies with 
this purpose, a lack of consensus exists regarding the factor structure.  By this literature 
review, numerous researchers have been identified who found that consensual weakness 
may be the result of methodological issues stemming from respondent bias (relating the 
party line), bias introduced by replicate survey instruments, or contextual variances.  Also 
identified and discussed are several studies from the literature that have applied Delphi 
methodologies to address the same weaknesses.  Therefore, the author concludes that the 
literature supports the application of Delphi as the methodology, and Hofstede’s (2001) 
onion model as the theoretical foundation, to identify the practices that relate to a positive 
safety culture.  Chapter III presents a discussion of a procedure for applying Delphi to the 
problem of identifying the organizational practices leading to a positive safety culture.    
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CHAPTER  III  
 
 METHODOLOGY 
 
Introduction to the Chapter  
 The review of the literature discussed in the previous chapter shows evidence that 
researchers of safety culture have not been able to report a general consensus regarding 
the factor structure of that culture, i.e. the antecedents of safety culture.  Therefore, the 
purpose of this dissertation study is to determine those organizational practices that lead 
to the establishment or maintenance of a positive safety culture.  In doing so, I have 
utilized a Delphi methodology in contrast to purely traditional quantitative studies that 
have typically been used by previous researchers.  
 This chapter begins with a brief overview of the Delphi method, followed by 
more detailed discussion of the methodological requirements of Delphi and the 
procedural steps to be followed.  For each appropriate step, I discuss important attributes 
reported in the literature, how that information led to the structure of the actions in this 
study, and the objective of conducting that procedural step.  I conclude the chapter with a 
discussion of validity and reliability expectations for the Delphi methodology. 
Overview of the Delphi Methodology 
The Delphi methodology is a mixed-method using an exploratory research 
approach coupled with explanatory approach, which when combined gains consensus 
about a problem solution.  A key feature of Delphi is the use of a purposefully selected 
group of participants who possess specialized knowledge in the problem discipline, 
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instead of the random sample traditionally used to inform research (Bonnemaizon, Cova, 
& Louyot, 2007; MacCarthy & Atthirawong, 2003; Ray & Sahu, 1990; Reid, 1988; Rowe 
& Wright, 1999; Saizarbitoria, Landin, & Fa, 2006).  The group of participants is 
frequently referred to as the “panel of experts.”  Delphi is an appropriate methodology for 
researching problems for which there is scarce or uncertain knowledge or which do not 
lend themselves to precise analytical techniques (Jairath & Weinstein, 1994; Williams & 
Webb, 1994).  Anonymity of the participants’ identity with respect to each other is 
maintained to eliminate interpersonal and inter-organizational bias.  Multiple iterative 
rounds of inquiries are used to gain consensus which is the Delphi equivalent to 
determining the statistical central tendency.  Leedy and Ormrod (2005) describe this 
approach as the “data analysis spiral” in which repetitive collection and analyses of the 
data spirals into a consensus final result. The exploratory nature of Delphi stems from its 
mixed-method methodology.  It begins with a qualitative inquiry and ends with a more 
traditional quantitative method to reach consensus. Open-ended questions are used for the 
first round inquiry to the participants to maximize inclusion of a full spectrum of 
variables (Linstone & Turoff, 2002).  Subsequent rounds of inquiry are aimed at reducing 
the spectrum of variables down to a smaller number, for which the panel of participants 
reaches consensus about inclusion and importance.  Each round of inquiry is prefaced 
with a summary of the results of the previous round, such that participants see the entire 
panel’s input, and can be expected to adjust their responses based upon the aggregate 
panel response (Scheibe, Skutsch, & Schofer, 2002).  The rounds of inquiry continue 
until consensus is confirmed, at which time the study is concluded.  
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In their “how-to” description, Linestone and Turoff (2002) specify five key 
requirements necessary for success of the Delphi method: (a) a purposefully selected 
panel of participants (experts) to inform the research, (b) anonymity of the panel 
participants, (c) multiple reiterative rounds of questioning, (d) controlled feedback 
between rounds, and (e) convergence to consensus.  The remainder of this chapter 
addresses this dissertation author’s application of the five key requirements of the Delphi 
methodology. 
Participants (the Panel of Experts) 
 One of the defining features of the Delphi methodology, and an essential element 
for its success, (Pasukeviciute & Roe, 2001) is purposeful sampling to inform the 
research instead of the random sampling desired for traditional quantitative research 
methods.  Sampling is done randomly when the goal is representation of a larger 
population (Babbie, 2004).  Purposeful sampling means “the researcher establishes in 
advance a set of criteria or attributes...then searches for exemplars that match the 
specified array of characteristics” (LeCompte, Preissle, & Tesch, 1993, p. 69).  Creswell 
(2003) states the reason for purposeful sampling is to “ensure a selection of participants 
that will best help the researcher understand the problem and answer the research 
question” (p.185).  Delbecq et al. (1975) call this sample a panel of experts.  Delbecq et 
al. (1975), Keeney, Hasson, and McKenna (2001), and Powell (2003) define experts as 
individuals accomplished in their field and respected as such by their peers.  
Pasukeviciute and Roe (2001) note that crucial for success is that the panel participants 
“must have a deep interest in the problem and experience to share” (p. 390) and they 
should be “representative of their profession or professional organization” (p. 390).   
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Delbecq, et al. (1975) note that besides expertise, panel members must be highly 
motivated to work on the problem and be willing to remain engaged for the duration of 
the study.  
For this dissertation study, I have pursued participants that meet the definition of 
expert from four different career disciplines: (a) safety professionals, (b) managers, (c) 
safety consultants, and (d) safety oversight officers.   All four of these types of people 
routinely observe, participate in, or recommend organizational practices that relate to 
accident and injury avoidance.  However, because their job functions are different, they 
view the practices through different lenses, which some researchers have found 
advantageous.  For example, Delbecq, et al. (1975), Powell (2003); and Rowe and Wright 
(2001) report those Delphi panel participants with widely varying personalities and 
substantially different perspectives produce higher quality and more acceptable solutions. 
Safety professionals are those employees whose primary job function is internal 
consulting and enforcement of both corporate and regulatory occupational safety 
requirements.  These employees are typically certified by an industry trade group and 
frequently are accountable to the highest level managers in the organization. They are 
usually positioned outside the line organization so they are not accountable for product 
quotas or schedules. However, they are frequently the promoters of the safety practices 
they observe.  Utilization of these experts on the Delphi panel in this study avoids bias 
that might be induced by organizational norms or peer and supervisory influence, yet still 
provides an “insider” viewpoint. 
 Managers are those employees who direct the activities of others and are 
accountable for accomplishment of the organization’s goals.  They are typically CEO’s, 
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COO’s, plant managers, or work group managers. Utilization of these experts brings to 
the panel the input of those people who position the value of safety within the strategy of 
the corporate or functional unit.  They also hold the positions within the firm that are held 
most accountable for accidents and incidents resulting from unsafe actions. 
 Safety consultants are safety professionals hired from outside the firm.  Like 
safety professionals previously described, they are independent of the line organizations, 
with less of a day-to-day exposure to employees.  They tend to bring a broader swath of 
experience to the Delphi panel, having seen more than one firm and more than one set of 
safety practices. 
 Safety oversight officers are those people who perform shop-floor audits and 
inspections and report to a regulatory agency, a standards committee, or an industry trade 
group.  They are independent of the line organization and the firm and, as auditors, do not 
usually perform field consulting while they observe.  Thus they are less likely to be 
biased by the business or social needs of the workers they are observing.  They bring to 
the panel an expertise viewed through a more wide-angled critical lens. 
 I have utilized the South Carolina chapter of the National Safety Council 
(SCNSC) to provide intermediary assistance with recruiting panel participants.  McKenna 
(1994) found that using an intermediary to facilitate contact with the potential participant, 
in contrast to a “cold call,” increases the willingness to participate and maintain 
involvement for the duration of the Delphi rounds.   The SCNSC is the state level chapter 
of the National Safety Council (NSC), operating at the national level, but with offices and 
resources located conveniently to this researcher’s primary location.  The SCNSC 
routinely provides training for managers and safety professionals at the majority of its 
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600 member firms. The SCNSC is closely networked with the Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration (OSHA), provides consulting services to its member firms 
nationwide, and routinely conducts occupational safety inspections, audits, and accident 
investigations.  As a result of those activities, the SCNSC has developed a nationwide 
sphere of influence which I have utilized to connect with potential candidates for the 
panel of participants for this dissertation study.   
Powell (2003) reports that participant panel size is an attribute that is equally as 
important as the panel’s level of expertise. Connsiderable discussion by researchers is 
found in the literature regarding the most appropriate size for a Delphi panel.  In a 
comparison of healthcare studies conducted over a 10 year period using Delphi 
methodologies, Reid (1988) found panel sizes to be as few as ten to as many as 1,685.  
Linstone and Turoff (2002) specify anywhere from 10 to 50 members.  Reid (1988) notes 
that replicability and generalizability of the results increases with panel size, but so does 
the dropout rate increase and concludes that 20 is near optimum size.  Bonnemaison, 
Cova, and Louyot (2007) found that eight to ten members was sufficient, with five to 
seven being the minimum threshold.  They noted that beyond 12, the marginal 
contributions were minimal.  Delbecq et al. (1975) notes when choosing the panel size, a 
tradeoff occurs between richness of data and attrition resulting from respondent fatigue.  
For this dissertation research, I set a goal of at least 24 participants to be remaining at the 
end of the study, which compares favorably to the recommendations of Linstone and 
Turoff (2002), Reid (1988), and Bonnemaison et al. (2007).  To accomplish that goal, 60 
were targeted for initial recruitment, which accommodates a potential exclusion rate of 
20 percent and a potential attrition rate of 50 percent (60 x (1.0- 0.20) x (1.0-.50) = 24).   
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 Panel participants are recruited by using a combination of purposive and snowball 
sampling (du Plessis & Human, 2007; Marsden, Dolan, & Holt, 2003).  For purposive 
sampling, some a priori knowledge exists regarding the candidate’s credentials to warrant 
a direct contact by the researcher or the intermediary.  This direct contact confirms the 
candidate meets inclusion criteria (discussed later), is willing to participate, and has 
potential to remain engaged for the duration of the study.  Purposive sampling adds some 
assurance that knowledgeable participants will be on the panel (du Plessis & Human, 
2007).  For snowball sampling, I asked those participants recruited by purposive 
sampling to identify other potential candidates for the Delphi panel.  Compliance with the 
inclusion criteria for the snowball recruits was ensured by my evaluation of the 
demographics data submitted with the first round inquiry (see Appendix C).  Recruitment 
of the panel was formalized by my letter contained in Appendix B.  To minimize 
attrition, Hasson et al. (2000) found it essential to inform participants at the onset, in 
writing, about the expectations of them for the study and I have delineated those 
obligations in the recruitment letter (Appendix B).   
 The following inclusion criteria were used for participants from the four separate 
career disciplines.  Managers must have at least one year experience directing the work of 
their subordinates and will have five or more subordinates reporting to them either 
directly or indirectly.  Safety professionals must hold entry-level or higher certification 
by an industry trade group or equivalent experience as defined by the job description.  
Safety consultants must have participated in providing counsel to at least three clients or 
hold entry-level or higher certification by an industry trade group.  Safety oversight 
officers must have participated in the conduct of at least three audits or inspections and 
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the reporting of findings, or hold entry-level or higher certification by an industry trade 
group for at least one year.  The industry trade group certification (BCSP, 2012) 
requirements were reviewed and deemed to contain appropriate subject matter expertise 
for inclusion criteria.  Participant compliance with the exclusion criteria was confirmed 
by personal contact in the case of purposive sampling and by examining the responses in 
the demographic section of the Round 1 Delphi Inquiry (see Appendix C).   
 It is noteworthy to conclude this subsection on “Participants” by describing more 
fully the recruitment letter in Appendix B.  Hasson et al. (2000) noted the importance of 
informing the panel with as much information as early as possible in the study.  It is 
through this letter that many of the important points just previously described will be 
accomplished, including: (a) explain the research and its purpose, (b) explain the intent of 
anonymity and the measures taken to ensure anonymity, (c) describe the expectations of 
the participants, (d) affirm the voluntary nature of this study, (e) obtain implied consent, 
and (f) provide contact information to the participant. 
Anonymity 
 The problem solving capability of the Delphi methodology relies on a structured 
group communication process which allows the individual participants to function as a 
whole when solving complex problems (Linstone & Turoff, 2002).  It relies on the 
proverb that “two heads are better than one” (Rowe, Wright, & Bolger, 1991).  However, 
group dynamics can introduce a number of biases when the participants interact face-to-
face, or are able to identify each other’s contributions (Goodman, 1987; Mead & 
Moseley, 2001).  Most threatening is the domineering personality or outspoken individual 
that takes over the process and inhibits other opinions (Couper, 1984).  Other sources of 
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bias include: unwillingness by some participants to take a position until all facts are 
presented, participants inhibited by higher authority positions, unwillingness to abandon a 
position once publicly taken, and participants who are concerned about how that their 
ideas may be received (appearance of idiocy) by others (de Viliers, de Villiers, & Kent, 
2005; Mead & Moseley, 2001, Weinstein, 1994).  To minimize such biases and maximize 
consensus, Inaki, Landin and Fa (2006), Keeney et al. (2001), MacCarthy and  
Atthirawong (2003), and Ray and Sahu (1990) strongly recommend that participants must 
not know the identity of the other members of the group, especially when opinions are 
being expressed.  Several steps were taken to ensure anonymity of the participants.  
Recruitment of the participants was accomplished by individualized letters that did not 
identify any other participants.  For snowball recruiting, the nodal participants were not 
informed if their recommended participants were included.  Finally, the specialized 
features of SurveyMonkey™, the web-based software for collecting data, were used to 
de-identify the data being collected while still preserving the mailing addresses of the 
participants. 
 Where instances of identifiable communications occurred, such as casual inquiries 
from participants, special precautions, such as external storage media, were taken to 
maintain confidentiality.  To ensure any gaps of anonymity did not lead to researcher 
bias, I ‘bracketed” potential pre-conceptions of the study as Creswell (1998) recommends 
for any typical qualitative analysis. 
Consensus 
 Consensus is vital to success for the Delphi methodology.  It is appropriate at this 
point to discuss the methods used in this research for measuring consensus especially 
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since these same methods form the bases for reducing the data between rounds.  Brooks 
(1979) defines consensus as “a gathering of individual evaluations around median 
responses with minimal divergence” (p. 378).  Powell (2003) defines it in terms such as 
“most participants agreed” (p. 379).  Katcher, et al. (2006) reported consensus was 
reached when all participants selected the same scale rating i.e., 100% agreement.  The 
variety of definitions led Crisp, Pelletier, Duffield, Adams, & Nagy (1997) to correctly 
conclude that the issue of consensus is one of the most contentious components of the 
Delphi methodology.   Nonetheless, a number of substantive approaches are reported in 
the literature for measuring consensus and which lead to defensible conclusions for this 
dissertation.  
The movement toward consensus was measured as soon as quantitative data was 
collected, i.e., beginning with the Round two inquiry.   The approaches for determining 
consensus reported by researchers in the literature span a wide range of sophistication.  
The lesser sophisticated are characterized by a “majority rules” approach, with the 
definition of majority ranging from 51% up to 100% (de Villiers et al., 2005; du Plessis 
& Human, 2007; Keeney et al., 2006; Katcher et al., 2006; Murry & Hammons, 1995; 
Williams & Webb, 1994), with the most dominant in the 70% to 80% range.  The risk of 
using simple majority is that bipolarity may exist and a significant minority opinion could 
get overlooked.   The simple majority approach can be improved by quantifying the 
“minimal divergence” in Brooks (1979) definition of consensus.  Williams and Webb 
(1994) used the standard deviation of the mean as a measure of divergence, using one 
standard deviation as the threshold.  If all practices fell within one standard deviation 
(68%) of the mean, consensus would be declared.  Dajani, Sincoff, and Talley (1979) 
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measured the coefficient of variation (standard deviation divided by the mean), V, and 
declared consensus when V was less than or equal to 0.5.  An alternative approach by 
Duffield (1993) declared consensus when no more than 10% of the scores changed 
(either direction) between rounds.  
To cope with potential bi-polarities in Delphi methodologies, Brightman and 
Schneider (1994), Linstone and Turoff (2002), and Saizarbitoria et al. (2006) recommend 
using the median instead of the mean to measure central tendency, and interquartile 
ranges (IQR) instead of standard deviations to measure divergence.  They note that 
median and IQR (value of the 75th percentile minus the 25th percentile) will allow 
detection of bipolar tendencies and at the same time effectively reduce the impact of 
statistical outliers.  Rather than “declaring” consensus, Saizarbitoria et al. (2006) reported 
the “degree of consensus” reached by comparing the change of the IQR from one round 
to the next.  Crisp et al. (1997) agrees that there is no black and white numerical decision 
point for consensus and that a judgment of stability is a preferable indication of 
consensus. 
My review of the literature uncovered four statistical measures of stability: (a) the 
two-sample z-test for the difference between two means (Hartnett & Murphy, 1985), (b) 
the Wilcoxon rank sum test statistic (Z) (Brightman & Schneider, 1994; Dovich, 1988), 
(c) the Kendall coefficient of concordance (W) (Jairath & Weinstein, 1994; Legendre, 
2005; Neter, Kutner, Nachtsheim, & Wasserman, 1996),  and (d) the Kruskal-Wallis test 
statistic (H) (Brightman & Schneider, 1994).  The two-sample z-test relies on either the t-
distribution or the standard z-distribution to assess the equality of the means for two 
Delphi rounds of inquiry.  Kendall’s W is a non-parametric statistic that assesses the 
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agreement among raters.  The raters, or participants, in a Delphi study rank the list of 
practices from most important to least important from which Kendall’s W is calculated.  
If W equals one, then agreement among the participants is unanimous; if zero, there is no 
agreement; and values in between indicate a greater or lesser degree of agreement.  The 
Wilcoxon Z is also a non-parametric statistic that assesses two different sets of data for 
the degree of difference in the dispersion around the two medians.  For a Delphi study, 
the Wilcoxon Z can be used to determine the change in divergence (dispersion about the 
median) from one round of inquiry to the next. Minimal change in the divergence would 
indicate stability.  The Kruskal-Wallis H is a non-parametric statistic that measures the 
degree of agreement between the medians of two sets of data or, in the case of a Delphi 
study, the medians of two successive rounds of inquiry. 
In this dissertation, I used a combination of the consensus approaches discussed 
above.  For the early rounds of inquiry, where the method is just transitioning from 
qualitative to quantitative, I used majorities, medians, and IQR’s for decisions regarding 
attrition of practices collected in the initial exploratory round.  With the second and 
subsequent rounds, I relied primarily upon two-sample z-tests of means equality and the 
non-parametric Wilcoxon Z test to evaluate the degree of consensus.  Application of 
these tests are presented in detail in Chapter IV.  
Multiple Iterative Rounds of Inquiry 
 The classic Delphi methodology is essentially an iterative series of questionnaires 
posed to the panel of participants.  In the Delbecq et al. (1975) model, the first 
questionnaire is a broad-based question.  Each subsequent questionnaire is built upon the 
responses of the preceding questionnaire.  The process stops when the responses attrite 
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down to a final set for which consensus can be confirmed. The following discussion 
describes the procedure, objective and justification for the each successive round. 
  Round 1 inquiry.   The objective of the Round 1 inquiry is to obtain a broad list 
of organizational practices the panel participants conclude are related to a positive safety 
culture.  The inquiry is deliberately non-specific to engage the respondents in 
“brainstorming” to elicit a wide-ranging list of practices.  In Chapter II,  
 I argued that the exploratory research contribution resulting from Delphi contrasts this 
study with previous safety culture research by not biasing the participant responses with a 
predetermined list of outcomes.   To that end, the recommendations of Delbecq et al. 
(1975) have been followed and the inquiries began with an open-ended question that 
allows free responses from the participants.  The impact of this open-ended, Round 1 
inquiry is best described by the converse analogy made by Linstone and Turoff (2002) to 
a multiple choice examination, which by its nature biases the respondent with insights of 
the instructor’s mode of thought as well as the substance of the question.  The use of an 
open-ended inquiry may necessitate additional rounds of inquiry.  However, the tradeoff 
is in favor of reduced bias imposed by the investigator. 
The open-ended approach has some drawbacks in that it can generate large, 
unmanageable amounts of data.  Therefore, Schmidt (1997) and Hasson et al. (2000) 
recommend limiting the number of items in the response for the first open-ended inquiry.  
In this dissertation, I set a limit of seven items for the first round of inquiry based upon 
the following examples in the literature:  Schmidt (1997) recommends a limit of six 
items; Ray and Sahu (1990) used a limit of five; and Schmidt, Lyytinen, Keil, and Cule 
(2001) used a limit of six.  Dressel, Consoli, Kim, and Atkinson (2007) did not define a 
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limit and received an average of seven items from the participants on the first round of 
inquiry.   Therefore, the limit of seven chosen for this study approximates response levels 
reported in the literature.    
Appendix C contains the Round 1 open-ended inquiry.  This particular inquiry 
format was selected to facilitate the analysis (discussed later) between Rounds 1and 2. I 
pilot tested the Round 1 inquiry questionnaire with potential panel participants to test 
readability and the delivery and collection channels.  In this Round 1, the participants are 
asked to provide up to seven practices as single words or short phrases (entered in the 
left-hand column) with attendant detailed explanations, including examples, in the right 
hand column.  The single word or short phrase descriptors for the practices (left-hand 
column) allows for more simplified removal of duplication.  The details and examples 
from the right-hand column provide more in-depth understanding of the practice 
descriptors, allowing additional collapsing of the list, or identifying the need for further 
reconciliation.  The Round 1 inquiry also collected demographic information about the 
potential participants (see Appendix C) which was used for judgment against the pre-
established inclusion/exclusion criteria. 
Following approval of the Internal Review Board, the Round 1 inquiry was 
transmitted to the potential participants as a web hyperlink in the recruitment letter.  The 
transmittal included guidance for completion of Round 1 and guidance for future data 
collection via the SurveyMonkey™ website. 
The Round 1 inquiry actually consisted of two separate surveys, 1a and 1b, daisy-
chained within the SurveyMonkey™ website.  The intent of the separation is to permit 
de-identification of the participants’ responses while still maintaining an e-mail address 
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list of the panel participants.  The 1a survey collected the actual subjective research data 
while the 1b survey collected demographic information and e-mail addresses. The “done” 
button at the end of 1a survey actually transferred the respondent into the 1b survey (the 
daisy-chain).  By this method research data and demographic/ID data were collected in 
two disconnected databases, thus producing de-identification of the participants. The ID 
data consisted of a simple e-mail address list used for transmitting Rounds 2, 3, and 4 
inquiries to the participants. 
Round 1 data analysis.  Two major objectives were the focus of the Round 1 
analysis: (a) to complete the inclusion-exclusion test for each potential panel participant, 
and (b) collapse the data into a single initial list of practices that are related to a positive 
safety culture.  Data collected by the SurveyMonkey™ website was down-loaded in a 
Microsoft Excel™ format which served the purpose of analysis and archive requirements. 
Demographic data.  I compared the demographic data for each participant against 
the inclusion criteria previously discussed.  Those meeting the inclusion criteria were e-
mailed by the author to thank them for their input and to confirm their e-mail addresses 
for inclusion in the SurveyMonkey™ collector.  At this point I also confirmed that the 
goals of recruiting at least 60 participants before exclusion tests, and at least 48 after 
exclusion tests were met.  The expected outcome of this part of the analysis was a starting 
count of the panel participants.  If less than 48, recruiting would continue until 48 
participants were obtained before continuing the analysis.  
Practices and descriptions.  The practices and attendant detailed descriptions 
were also collected in Microsoft Excel™ format.  The first step was to review the list and 
remove undisputable duplicates, and miscellaneous off-normal responses.   Delbecq et al. 
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(1975) notes that whenever an open-ended question is offered in confidence, human 
nature can produce some strange responses. A frequency count of duplication was 
maintained for feedback in the next round of inquiry  
I applied software-assisted content-analyses to the practice descriptors and the 
detailed explanations and examples (right-hand and left hand columns of survey 
questionnaire in Appendix C) to discover commonalities that might justify thematic 
clustering and further collapse of the list (Babbie, 2004: Creswell 1998).   As necessary, a 
thesaurus was used to review synonyms and words for likeness and combination.  Where 
two or more practice descriptors appeared identical and collapsible, but the detailed 
explanations were even slightly different, both detailed explanations were retained and 
combined to capture the full breadth of the response.   Hasson et al. (2000) reports that a 
basic tenet of Delphi is that participants should ultimately be the judges, not the 
researcher.  Therefore, where doubt existed about identicalness, I reiterated the original 
data back into the following round of inquiry (du Plessis & Human, 2007). 
I then applied software-assisted content- analyses to each of the thematic clusters 
to discover commonalities that might further collapse into specific practices with 
aggregated definitions.  I tracked the number of times a practice or definitional phrase 
was mentioned so that it could be translated into a frequency for feedback in the next 
round of inquiry.  The outcome of this Round 1 analysis was an initial list of practices, 
the frequency each occurred, and a detailed definition associated with each practice.  This 
outcome was peer debriefed prior to proceeding to the Round 2 inquiry. 
Round 1 peer debriefing.  du Plessis and Human (2007) recommend peer 
debriefing as a way to increase the validity of the Delphi process.  Lincoln and Guba 
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(1985) describe it as exposing the study’s process, interim results, and investigator to a 
disinterested peer to explore aspects of the study that might otherwise remain implicit in 
the researcher’s mind.  They specify four responsibilities of the peer: (a) act as devil’s 
advocate, (b) test working conclusions that may be emerging in the researcher’s mind, (c) 
test the next steps in the emerging methodology, and (d) provide the researcher an 
opportunity for catharsis.  I peer debriefed at this point with a non-business university 
faculty member possessing substantive knowledge of occupational safety and qualitative 
research methods. 
Feedback: Round 1 to Round 2.  For the Delphi methodology, the results of the 
Round 1 analysis form the basis for the feedback included in the Round 2 inquiry.   
Goodman (1987) reports that the strength of the Delphi process lies in the feedback to 
guide the panel of participants toward a consensual conclusion.  Keeney et al. (2001) 
describes the feedback as “the process that facilitates the systematic emergence of a 
judgment” (p. 197).   Crisp et al. (1997) and Powell (2003) observe that feedback is the 
primary channel of communication between members of the panel and its quality and 
quantity is essential to obtaining a group decision.  Rowe et al. (1991) note that it is 
crucial that the feedback contain both the majority opinions (central tendency) and the 
minority opinions (the outliers) to ensure that improvement of the participants’ positions 
are maximized.  Based on this guidance from the literature, I used the Round 2 inquiry to 
feed back to the participants the complete information from the Round 1 analysis 
including: the collapsed list of practice descriptors, the attendant descriptions, and the 
frequencies of occurrence.   
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Round 2 inquiry.  A mixed-method version of the Delphi methodology uses both 
qualitative and quantitative methods and the transition begins with this Round 2 inquiry.  
The objectives of the Round 2 inquiry are to:  (a) provide the participants with sufficient 
feedback from the first round to allow them to comprehend the positions of the other 
participants; (b) obtain each participants quantifiable agreement, or disagreement, with 
practices that should remain on the list; and (c) obtain quantifiable decisions from each 
participant about how important each of the practices is for establishing or maintaining a 
positive safety culture.  Keeney et al. (2001) recommend that all post Round 1 inquiries 
be structured questionnaires that incorporate feedback from the previous rounds. Delbecq 
et al. (1975) recommend that the response method be simple to understand. I used the 
complete list of practices produced by the Round 1 analysis in combination with 5-point 
Likert-type scales to obtain the participants’ judgment on agreement and importance 
ranking of the practices (See Appendix E).  The inquiry is a three-part questionnaire:  
Section A queries the participants for their judgment that the practice belongs on the list; 
Section B queries the participant for importance ranking of the practice; and Section C 
queries the participant for missing or emergent data.  The frequency, i.e., the number of 
respondents who mentioned the practice or some portion of the description of the 
practice, is included in the first sentence of Section A that introduces the practice. 
At the bottom of the scale, section is included for the respondents to explain 
entries at the extremities of the scale.  Rowe et al. (1991) reported that it was important to 
capture and communicate the outliers, and this part of the inquiry is intended to 
accomplish that purpose.   
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Section C is included for the purpose of capturing practices that were missed by 
the participants in the Round 1 inquiry, or practices that were lost during collapsing in the 
Round 1 analysis.  Section C further serves to close the loop on the “member checking” 
that is intended to support the validity of this study (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). 
I used the SurveyMonkey™ website to transmit the Round 2 inquiry and receive 
the responses from the participants.  Round 2 was pilot-tested like Round 1 and adjusted 
as necessary. 
Round 2 data analysis.  The objectives of the Round 2 analysis are to detect early 
indications of consensus by the panel of participants about which practices might be 
related to a positive safety culture, and to use the early indication to decide which 
practices should be carried forward to the Round 3 inquiry.  Some practices will stay on 
the list, while others will be deleted from any further analysis.   I converted responses to 
quantitative data by assigning numerical scores to the scale responses: “5” for strongly 
agree and very important; “1” for strongly disagree and very unimportant; and others 
portioned equally between.  With quantitative measures, I used traditional statistical 
measures to interpret convergence to consensus.  Per the previous discussion regarding 
consensus, I used the 70% to 80% range as the first test for decisions to drop or carry 
forward practices to the Round 3 inquiry.  The following rules were applied for making 
the first decisions: 
Practices for which 80% of the participants selected “strongly agree, agree, very 
important, or important” will be carried to Round 3. 
Practices for which 80% of the participants selected “strongly disagree, disagree, 
unimportant, or very unimportant” will not be carried to Round 3. 
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Because the first test rules above are examining the extremes of the spectrum, I expected 
some number of practices, specifically those between the extremes, to require further 
examination to determine carryover.  I examined these remaining practices on a case-by-
case basis using medians and interquartile ranges (IQR)  (Brightman & Schneider, 1994; 
Linstone & Turoff, 2002; Milkovich, Annoni, & Mahoney, 1972; Saizarbitoria et al. 
2006) to judge dispersion of the responses.  Wide dispersion indicates that the participant 
panel is still too divergent on consensus, and further inquiry is warranted; however, a 
narrower dispersion indicates early convergence and the practice may be a candidate for 
dropping .  I used this dispersion measure and the position of the median to make a 
judgment whether to drop or carry over those practices falling between the consensus 
rules previously discussed.   The expected outcome of this part of the second round 
analysis is a shortened list of practices. 
 The Round 2 inquiry also asks the participants to list any “new” or “missing” 
practices after the scale ratings.  If any practices retrieved from this section of the inquiry 
exactly matched those that were dropped, they also would be dropped.  All remaining 
new or missing practices would be added to the shortened list and carried forward to 
Round 3 for evaluation by the participants. 
Feedback: Round 2 to Round 3.  As done in the previous round, feedback to the 
participants included information from the Round 2 analysis: the further-collapsed list of 
practice descriptors, the attendant descriptions, and the individual scoring information for 
each practice.   
Round 3 inquiry.   The objectives of the Round 3 inquiry were to:  (a) provide the 
participants with sufficient feedback from the first round to allow them to comprehend 
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the positions of the other participants; (b) obtain each participant’s quantifiable 
agreement, or disagreement, with practices that should remain on the list; and (c) obtain 
quantifiable decisions from each participant about how important each of the practices is 
for establishing or maintaining a positive safety culture.  The format of this inquiry is 
almost identical to the previous round with the exception being the additional votes 
received in the previous inquiry for each item on the scales (see Appendix F).  As with 
the previous rounds of inquiry, I pilot-tested test this inquiry for readability and function, 
and made adjustments as necessary  
Round 3 analysis. The primary objective of this analysis was to determine the 
degree of consensus regarding the practices that lead to a positive safety culture.  I used 
the two-sample z-test for means equality and the non-parametric Wilcoxon Z test to 
determine consensus.  
Round 4 Inquiry. The objectives of this final inquiry were to confirm consensus 
and obtain final member checking.  I also used this inquiry to thank participants, solicit 
feedback, and provide an opportunity to request a summary of results.  
Validity and Reliability 
Researchers have vigorously debated whether the Delphi technique can be 
considered valid and reliable by traditional definition (Crisp, Pelletier, Duffield, Adams, 
& Nagy, 1997; Goodman, 1987; Keeney, Hasson, & McKenna, 2001; McKenna, 1993; 
Powell, 2003; Rowe, Wright, & Bolger, 1991; Williams & Webb, 1994).  Procedural 
issues are frequently the bases for criticisms, particularly the lack of a singular 
experimental design.  Some researchers have suggested that because Delphi aligns more 
with qualitative research methods, the concepts of validity and reliability should be 
54 
 
replaced by discussion of credibility (LeCompte, Preissle, & Tesch, 1993) or 
trustworthiness (Creswell, 1998; Lincoln & Guba, 1985;).  For this dissertation study, I 
used a classical Delphi technique which is a mixed-method utilizing both qualitative and 
quantitative inquiries.  Therefore, in the following discussion, I address the subject of 
quality in traditional terms of validity and reliability.   As the Delphi technique became 
more pervasive in last two decades, common suggestions for improvement of the quality 
have begun to emerge (Crisp, Pelletier, Duffield, Adams, & Nagy, 1997; Hasson, 
Keeney, & McKenna, 2000; Rowe, Wright, & Bolger, 1991; Williams & Webb, 1994). I 
describe the study rigor intended to maximize validity and reliability. 
Internal Validity.  Lincoln and Guba (1985) define internal validity as “the extent 
to which variations in an outcome (dependent) variable can be attributed to controlled 
variation in an independent variable.  A causal connection between dependent and 
independent variables is usually assumed” (p. 290).   This definition suggests a research 
design that would test outcome variance against the error variance.  Research designs 
using Delphi methodology, including this dissertation research design, are exploratory or 
explanatory in nature and the researchers do not typically seek out causal relationships.  
Thus, on the surface, the concept of internal validity does not appear to have strong 
relevancy for this dissertation study.  However, Leedy and Ormrod (2005) note that 
internal validity is important in any research project because the research must have 
confidence that the conclusions drawn are warranted from the data collected.   Lincoln 
and Guba (1985) address eight procedural threats to the validity of study findings 
regardless of causality.  Because of the non-experimental nature of Delphi used in this 
dissertation study, four of those threats have some applicability: (a) history, (b) 
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maturation, (c) sampling, and (d) panel attrition.  History refers to unforeseen external 
events that might occur between rounds of inquiry and confound the measurements.  
Because such events are unforeseen, they cannot be controlled. Nevertheless, their 
likelihood will be minimized by keeping the turnaround time between inquiries as short 
as possible. I maintained strict confidentiality of panel member identities to prevent 
unforeseen emergence of the biases induced by group dynamics that were previously 
discussed.  Maturation effects occur when the passage of time between inquiries is long 
enough to allow the thought processes of the respondent to change.  Again the potential 
effects of maturation were mitigated as much as possible by minimizing the turnaround 
time between inquiries.  
Sampling in Delphi research is not randomized, but rather a purposeful selection 
of panel participants who have representative knowledge, interest in the topic, and 
willingness to engage in the iterative process of Delphi.  In this dissertation, I rely on the 
inclusion and exclusion criteria previously discussed to staff the panel.   Panel attrition is 
the most significant threat to the validity of the Delphi methodology, and in this 
dissertation it was minimized by limitations on the panel size.  Larger panels might 
produce richer data, but the iterative participant response required might also cause 
respondent fatigue resulting in disengagement, poor response rates, and ultimately 
attrition.  Some tradeoffs are inevitable.  In this dissertation, I minimized attrition by 
controlling feedback information to reduce overload, and used reminder mailings.  Baker, 
Lovell, and Harris (2006), Hasson, Keeney, and McKenna (2000), and Williams and 
Webb (1994), report that both purposeful selection of the Delphi panel and the actions 
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taken to minimize their attrition are also actions that increase content, face, and 
concurrent validity of the study.  
Finally, Silverman (2005) notes that both qualitative and quantitative researchers 
have no “golden key” to internal validity.  To maximize internal validity in this 
dissertation, I have rigorously executed all of the above discussed strategies and have 
used “member checks” to raise the confidence that the conclusions drawn are warranted 
(Leedy & Ormrod, 2005).  I have deliberately structured the participant feedback from 
one round of inquiry to the subsequent round to accomplish, in part, the member 
checking.  Besides completeness of the feedback, I requested “missed” information in the 
subsequent rounds of inquiry to the participants. The missed information request affords 
the participants an opportunity to adjust the author’s analyses.   
External Validity.  Lincoln and Guba (1985) and Leedy and Ormrod (2005) define 
external validity as the extent to which the conclusions drawn are generalizable.  Lincoln 
and Guba (1985) identify four threats to the external validity: (a) history, (b) selection 
effects, (c) setting effects, and (d) construct effects.  The history threat for external 
validity is the same as internal validity and the mitigating strategy has already been 
addressed.  The selection effect threat occurs when the sample is not representative of the 
population.  The setting effect threat occurs when the context of the study is too limited 
or the limits are not known.  The construct effects threat refers to the possibility that the 
construct under study is applicable only to a sample or a different population.   
Leedy and Ormrod (2005) provide three strategies for minimizing the threats and 
maximizing external validity: (a) real life setting, (b) representative sample, and (c) 
replication.  These three strategies do not necessarily correspond respectively to the 
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aforementioned threats.  It is the combination of the strategies that mitigate the combined 
effects of the threats.  The purposeful selection of the Delphi panel of experts, as 
previously described, is how I have deployed the strategies of real life setting and 
representative sample.  Regarding the third strategy, replication, I do not plan to replicate 
this dissertation study under another context, but rather rely upon demonstrations of 
replication by prior researchers and strict adherence to the protocol and procedures of the 
Delphi methodology is rigorously followed.  
Reliability. Lincoln and Guba (1985) consider reliability to be synonymous with 
consistency and accuracy, and testable by replication.  They report the threats to 
reliability will most likely come from careless acts in the measurement or assessment 
process.  I have used peer debriefing (Creswell, 2003; Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Williams 
& Webb, 1994) with at least one outside reader to review the data management including 
collapsing, combining, and interpreting of data, where potential exists for bias or 
distortion.  This approach, when combined with member checks, ensures transparency of 
the study and improves the reliability of the outcomes.  
Chapter III Conclusion 
 Two important notions were described in the literature review in Chapter II:  First, 
the link between practices and safety culture; and second, the lack of general consensus 
of the factor structure of safety culture attributable to the methodologies that have thus far 
been used to explore that factor structure.  In this Chapter III, an alternative research 
method, the Delphi methodology, has been presented in detail as a means for defining 
antecedents of safety culture while eliminating the biases that may have contributed to 
lack of consensus in previous research. 
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 Chapter IV presents data collection results and their analysis.  With the Delphi 
methodology there are multiple inquiries and data captures, including separate analyses 
between data collections.   Data are presented in sufficient detail to explain the collapsing 
of results.  Where appropriate, discussions include explanation of decision-making for 
carryover into subsequent rounds including the supporting statistics.  The final Chapter V 
summarizes the results, conclusions, implications for practitioners, and extensions for 
further research.  
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CHAPTER  IV 
 
 
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 
Introduction to the Chapter 
 The goal of this research study was to determine the organizational practices that 
lead to the establishment or maintenance of a positive safety culture.  I have exhaustively 
discussed the lack of a general consensus in the literature regarding the factor structure of 
safety culture.  I have also argued that a Delphi research methodology, which includes an 
exploratory research component, is appropriate for addressing the gaps in the existing 
research that may be contributing to the lack of consensus on factor structure.  This 
chapter presents the results and the concurrent analyses of having executed the Delphi 
approach described in Chapter III.   
Data Collection 
 All data were collected using the SurveyMonkeyTM website.  Special restrictive 
settings had to be selected for the SurveyMonkeyTM operation to ensure anonymity and 
confidentiality.  Using Delphi presents somewhat of a challenge.  Delphi requires 
multiple queries of the same set of participants; therefore, it was necessary to know the 
contact information (e-mail addresses) of the participants for subsequent queries.  I 
separated the Round 1 inquiry into two surveys within SurveyMonkeyTM so the e-mail 
addresses collected would be stored separately from all other data.  This approach 
successfully de-identified the data, however, the drawbacks are discussed in Chapter V. 
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The Participants (Panel of Experts) 
 The South Carolina National Safety Council provided a consultant who acted as 
an intermediary for recruiting most of the panel participants.  The intermediary had some 
personal and professional knowledge of the candidates which provided better assurance 
that the goals of the panel makeup would be readily attained.  Appendix A is the 
authorization to make the necessary contacts for this research.  Approximately one half of 
the initial panel membership was recruited by direct contact and the other half by 
snowballing.  The snowballing was accomplished primarily through the intermediary’s 
blog site. 
 The recruitment letter (see Appendix B) contained a web hyperlink which led the 
participant to enter the survey website.  Potential participants could opt-out by simply not 
clicking on the hyperlink.   
 Initial recruitment was 68 participants versus my goal of 60.  This goal was based 
upon worst-case attrition rates mentioned in the literature from which I forecasted an end-
of-study panel size of 24.  Actual attrition rates were less than half of those rates in the 
literature and panel participant sizes are reflected in Table 7. 
 Recruitment was part of the Round 1 inquiry.  The demographic data (see 
Appendix C) was used to test for the exclusion-inclusion against the criteria previously 
discussed. Three respondents were excluded:  One respondent (safety professional) failed 
to meet the industry certification criteria; a second respondent (manager) chose not to 
provide the span-of-control data necessary for evaluation and was therefore excluded; 
and a third respondent provided frivolous responses suggestive of an unreliable 
informant.  The profile of the panel initially recruited is shown in Table 1.  Having met 
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the profile goals of six participants from each category, I proceeded with the remaining 
analysis of Round 1 data. 
 
Table 1 
 
Delphi Panel Participants by Occupation 
 
Participant Category 
Initially 
Recruited Excluded* 
Final Number of 
participants 
Safety Professional 48 2 46 
Auditor or Regulator 7 0 7 
Consultant 7 0 7 
Manager 9 1 8 
Total 68 
*One Safety Professional was excluded for failure to meet professional certification 
criteria; a second Safety Professional was excluded for responding frivolously; and one 
manager was excluded for failure to provide span-of-control information. 
 
 
Round 1 Inquiry 
The primary focus of the Round 1 inquiry was the collection of up to seven 
“practices” and definitions from each panel participant.  The question format was open-
ended (see Appendix C) to facilitate the exploratory research component of this 
dissertation study.  In total, 275 practices were tallied prior to analysis.  Submission rates 
averaged 4.1 practices per panel participant and ranged from one to seven per participant.  
Thirty-one practices were submitted without an attendant definition.  All other practice 
responses contained definitions.  A few definitions were in excess of 100 words each.  
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All information was obtained within 10 days following issuance of the recruitment letter.  
The collector for Round 1 was left open for 30 days; however, the latter 20 days of the 
period were silent.  All data were downloaded into an ExcelTM spread sheet for further 
analysis. 
I used Creswell’s (1998) phenomenology model for textual analysis.  A computer-
assisted word-and-phrase-search software routine was used for the first-pass textual 
analysis.  My objective was to sort the data into more manageable chunks (Miles & 
Huberman, 1998) according to broad subject categories.  I identified 13 broad categories 
as shown in Table 2.  All raw data was match-fitted into one of these 13 broad categories 
and then each category was separately analyzed.   
I analyzed the individual broad categories by selecting sentences and phrases that 
had similar themes.  The broad categories, including the raw data, were laid out on a 
Table top map and phrases were color coded to match themes.  These tabletop color-
coded maps proved useful in conducting the peer debriefings.  Similar color-coded 
phrases were extracted from the raw data and recomposed into a single practice 
descriptor and detailed definition.  During the de-composition and re-composition 
process, care was taken to record the number of times the theme was cited by different 
panel participants.  The re-compositions, including the citation frequencies, would be 
returned to the Delphi panel for the next round of inquiry.  Appendix D is a detailed 
example of the previously described thematic analysis for the broad category of 
“management.”  I disaggregated the raw data in this category and recomposed them into 
four candidate practices and definitions for a return to the Round 2 inquiry.  I have used 
differentiating fonts in Appendix D as a proxy for the color-coded maps.  
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Table 2 
Practices Collected By Round One Inquiry 
Broad Category Practice n Definition 
Management 1. Management 
involvement and 
participation 
 
11 Walk the talk.  Managers at all levels are 
involved in all EHS activities such as 
safety meetings, safety program  & goals 
development, evaluating performance 
metrics, audits, inspections, pre-startup 
safety reviews, job cycle checks, 
incident investigations, and wearing the 
appropriate personal protective 
equipment just like front line workers. 
 
2. Safety leadership  
 
4 Managers set safety goals and objectives 
for accident frequencies and employee 
participation in safety activities, 
including measurement criteria for 
performance against those goals, and 
communicates the goals and 
performance frequently to the entire 
organization. 
 
3. Management 
systems 
 
3 A system of corporate governance exists 
that defines and owns safety as a 
corporate value, states a vision and 
belief about the value of safety, and 
defines the roles and expectations of all 
members for safety.  
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Broad Category Practice n Definition 
4. Management 
commitment 
 
3 Management makes accident reduction 
an integral part of the business plan by 
allocating sufficient budget and 
manpower resources to support 
attainment of the safety goals and 
objectives. 
 
Communication 5. Posters, signs, 
banners, and E-
mails 
 
8 Use of signs, posters, banners and other 
visual materials to either warn people of 
hazards or to promote safe practices.  
Use memos or e-mails where signs are 
not appropriate. 
 
6. Atmosphere of 
openness 
 
10 Conduct open communication regarding 
safety problems and concerns.  
Reinforce that retaliation will never 
result from reporting a safety concern or 
counter opinion. 
 
7. Share experiences 
 
10 Use videos, written reports, 
presentations, and personal discussions 
to communicate lessons learned from 
safety successes and accident analyses.  
Communicate to everyone including 
customers. 
 
8. Communications 
accuracy 
 
6 Ensure job communications are frequent 
and accurate by using phonetics and 
repeat-backs. 
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Broad Category Practice n Definition 
Near miss  
 
9. Near miss review 
 
6 A formalized system for reporting, 
analyzing, and acting upon near-miss 
accidents.  No-fault self-reporting is 
encouraged.  Analysis is for root cause. 
Remedial actions are determined, 
deployed, and communicated. 
 
Hazard 
assessment 
 
10. Hazard 
assessment 
 
6 Hazards analyses are conducted for 
specific jobs and facilities on a recurring 
schedule to identify potential hazards 
and the adequacy of their mitigation.  
Procedures and work instructions are 
included for compliance, with specific 
focus on changed conditions.  Corrective 
actions are documented. 
 
Oversight 11. Audits 
 
8 Formalized audits of worker safety and 
the safety programs are conducted 
according to a written plan and schedule.  
Findings are recorded, reported and 
tracked through disposition. 
 
12. Inspections and 
walkthroughs 
 
8 Less formal than an audit.  Conducted in 
the work place by all levels of 
management and peers.  Findings are 
corrected as they are found.  Interaction 
is encouraged.  Reporting, if any, is 
more general. 
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Broad Category Practice n Definition 
13. Observations 
 
9 Usually conducted by peers as part of a 
behavior-based program.  Findings are 
corrected on the spot.  Reporting is de-
identified. 
 
Safety first 14. Putting safety 
first 
 
3 Commonly called toolbox talks, pre-job 
briefs, or meeting preambles.  Start all 
evolutions with a discussion about 
safety. 
 
Training 15. Orientation 
training 
 
11 Newly assigned employees are trained in 
foundational S&H topics. 
 
16. Monthly safety 
meetings 
 
17 Monthly meetings are venues for 
essential ongoing S&H training.  They 
consist of timely S&H topics, lessons 
learned, shared experiences, and 
program changes.  They are typically 
interactive and rely on participant 
involvement. 
 
17. Conferences 
 
3 Safety professionals attend national 
conferences to gain cutting edge 
knowledge of the latest advances in 
safety. 
 
18. Annual training 
and testing 
 
4 Every employee annually receives S&H 
refresher training and must satisfactorily 
pass a test. 
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Broad Category Practice n Definition 
19. Job specific 
training 
 
5  Employees are trained to be skilled at 
their specific task, use the correct tools, 
follow the work plans (procedures), and 
recognize abnormal conditions. 
 
20. Training quality 
 
3 All training is conducted by qualified 
instructors, is objective based, contains 
real (versus hypothetical) situations, and 
is assessed periodically. 
 
Employee 
involvement 
 
21. Employee 
involvement 
 
26 Employees at all levels of the 
organization participate in training, 
observation, inspection, problem 
solving, committee participation, policy 
and procedure development, and 
accountability for safety performance. 
 
Stop work 
authority & 
Time Out 
22. Time Out  26  All employees have the responsibility 
and authority to stop work or declare a 
stand down when an evolution in 
progress does not appear to be 
proceeding safely.  All employees are 
encouraged to maintain a healthy 
uneasiness with a questioning attitude 
and call for a stop-work when the 
situation doesn't "feel" right. 
Accountability 23. Performance 
evaluations 
include safety 
 
8 Personal safety performance is included 
as part of the annual performance 
review. 
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Broad Category Practice n Definition 
24. Disciplinary 
actions 
 
8 Appropriate sanctions are administered 
against employees who fail to perform 
safely. 
 
25. Enforcement 
 
3 Organizations that fail to comply with 
S&H policies, rules, and regulations are 
penalized (e.g., compensation), 
including suppliers and customers. 
 
Trust 26. Building trust 
 
11 Coach instead of being a police officer, 
avoid placing blame, follow through on 
commitments, correct problems rather 
than just reporting them, and constantly 
use good interpersonal skills. 
 
Documented 
policies 
27. Policies and 
procedures 
 
15 Written guidance and instructions exist 
for safely conducting evolutions at all 
levels in the organization.  Content is in 
compliance with statutory regulations, 
corporate values, and industry best 
practices.  Content is user-friendly. 
 
28. Periodic review 
of policies and 
procedures 
 
10 Policies and procedures are reviewed 
periodically and revised promptly to 
comply with changed conditions. 
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Broad Category Practice n Definition 
Incentives 29. Pay for 
performance 
 
11 Financial incentives (pay bonuses), 
clearly tied to positive S&H 
performance, are provided to all 
employees who contribute toward 
achieving goals and objectives. 
 
30. Celebration 
 
11 Recognition events are held to reward 
S&H accomplishments.  
Commemorative tokens are provided to 
mark the occasion.  All employees are 
provided the time to celebrate. 
Note.  n = the number of respondents who cited the particular practice. 
 
The remaining 12 broad categories were analyzed according to the same process 
described in Appendix D.  Initially, 28 recomposed practices were identified.  However, 
as the result of peer debriefing, I elected to subdivide two of the practices resulting in a 
total of 30 practices for the Round 2 inquiry.  I conducted the peer debriefing with a Nova 
Southeastern University faculty member who was familiar with the Delphi methodology, 
but not a member of the business school. She provided excellent devil’s advocacy.  Table 
2 contains the results of my complete analysis of the data from the Round 1 inquiry, 
including the first cut broad categories, the re-composed practice descriptors and detailed 
definitions, and n, the frequency of citation. 
 
Round 2 Inquiry 
 The objectives of the Round 2 inquiry were to (a) transition from qualitative to 
quantitative inquiry, (b) provide the participants with sufficient feedback from the first 
70 
 
round analysis to allow them to comprehend the positions of the other participants; (c) 
obtain each participant’s quantifiable agreement, or disagreement, with the recomposed 
practices and descriptions; (d) obtain quantifiable decisions from each participant 
regarding the importance of each practice for establishing or maintaining a positive safety 
culture; and (e) provide an opportunity to challenge the results of my judgments made 
during the Round 1 analysis.   
Appendix E is an example of the Round 2 inquiry provided to the participants via 
SurveyMonkeyTM.  The Appendix shows the complete detail for the first practice 
“Management Involvement and Participation.”  It begins with a statement of the practice, 
frequency of citation by the panel, and the composed definition of the practice.  Section 
A queries the participants’ agreement, using a 5-point scale, with the practice as it has 
been composed; Section B queries the participants’ view of the importance, using a 5-
point scale, the practice has for achieving a positive safety culture.  This same line of 
inquiry was repeated for all remaining 29 practices.  The repetition of each practice was 
excluded from Appendix E to save space.  Section C queried for an open-ended response 
to provide the participants an opportunity to revise the list of 30 practices and offer any 
non-specific comments.  The Round 2 inquiry was e-mailed to all the addresses provided 
by the Round 1 inquiry except for the 3 exclusions. No delivery failures occurred.   
Fifty-two of the original 68 panel participants responded to the Round 2 inquiry.  
Because of the data de-identification requirement, non-responders could not be 
specifically pursued.  I elected to wait no longer and closed the data collector at 52 
because it compared favorably with my forecast of 40 after attrition.  Not all 52 
participants responded to all of the inquiry questions.  The responses per question ranged 
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from a low of 49 to a high of 52.  Actual response rates are given by “N” in Table 3.  The 
5-point scale responses were assigned scores for computational analysis.  For the 
agreement inquiry, strongly agree was assigned 5 points, and strongly disagree was 
assigned 1 point with intermediates evenly spaced.  For the importance inquiry, very 
important was assigned 5 points, and very unimportant was assigned 1 point with 
intermediates evenly spaced.  The data were analyzed with SPSSTM and the descriptive 
statistics are presented in Table 3.  
 
Table 3 
 
Practices Evaluated by Round 2 inquiry 
 Practice 
N 
Mean 
Score 
Median 
Score σ IQR 
5+4 
% Action 
1 Management involvement 
and participation 
 
      
Agreement 52 4.87 5 0.341 0 100 Retain Importance 52 4.94 5 0.233 0 100 
2 
 
 
Safety leadership        
Agreement 52 4.54 5 0.603 1 94 Retain Importance 51 4.63 5 0.656 1 90 
3 
 
 
Management systems        
Agreement 52 4.37 4.5 0.735 1 88 Retain Importance 51 4.41 5 0.746 1 88 
4 
 
 
Management commitment        
Agreement 50 4.74 5 0.522 0 96 Retain Importance 50 4.80 5 0.400 0 100 
5 
 
 
Posters, signs, banners, and 
E-mails 
 
      
Agreement 52 3.69 4 1.048 1 69 Drop Importance 52 3.60 4 1.079 1 58 
6 
 
 
Atmosphere of openness        
Agreement 52 4.65 5 0.676 1 92 Retain Importance 52 4.71 5 0.660 0 96 
7 
 
 
Share experiences        
Agreement 52 4.31 4 0.666 1 88 Retain Importance 52 4.13 4 0.785 2 75 
8 
 
Communications accuracy        
Agreement 52 3.85 4 0.907 2 62 Drop 
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 Practice 
N 
Mean 
Score 
Median 
Score σ IQR 
5+4 
% Action 
 Importance 51 3.84 4 0.872 2 61 
9 
 
 
Near miss review  
      
Agreement 51 4.33 5 0.784 1 80 Retain Importance 51 4.35 5 0.836 1 80 
10 
 
 
Hazard assessment  
      
Agreement 51 4.57 5 0.602 1 94 Retain Importance 51 4.63 5 0.593 1 94 
11 
 
 
Audits  
      
Agreement 51 4.25 4 0.737 1 86 Retain Importance 51 4.24 4 0.730 1 86 
12 
 
 
Inspections and 
walkthroughs 
 
      
Agreement 51 4.57 5 0.533 1 98 Retain Importance 51 4.61 5 0.527 1 98 
13 
 
 
Observations  
      
Agreement 51 4.00 4 0.840 2 69 Drop Importance 51 3.94 4 0.872 2 63 
14 
 
 
Putting safety first  
      
Agreement 51 4.16 4 0.849 1 80 Drop Importance 51 4.12 4 0.878 1 76 
15 
 
 
Orientation training  
      
Agreement 51 4.63 5 0.483 1 100 Retain Importance 51 4.55 5 0.695 1 98 
16 
 
 
Monthly safety meetings  
      
Agreement 51 4.27 4 0.794 1 82 Retain Importance 51 4.22 4 0.800 1 76 
17 
 
 
Conferences   
      
Agreement 51 3.78 4 0.976 2 57 Drop Importance 51 3.65 4 1.026 2 53 
18 
 
 
Annual training and testing  
      
Agreement 51 3.82 4 0.964 1 71 Drop Importance 51 3.63 4 1.102 1 61 
19 
 
 
Job specific training  
      
Agreement 51 4.57 5 0.634 1 96 Retain Importance 51 4.57 5 0.693 1 92 
20 
 
 
Training quality  
      
Agreement 51 4.24 4 0.703 1 88 Retain Importance 51 4.24 4 0.782 1 82 
21 
 
 
Employee involvement  
      
Agreement 50 4.62 5 0.690 1 92 Retain Importance 50 4.58 5 0.751 1 88 
22 Stop work authority  
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 Practice 
N 
Mean 
Score 
Median 
Score σ IQR 
5+4 
% Action 
 
 
Agreement 50 4.64 5 0.592 1 94 Retain Importance 50 4.60 5 0.632 1 92 
23 
 
 
Performance evaluations  
      
Agreement 50 4.32 4 0.811 1 90 Retain Importance 50 4.24 4.5 0.950 1 82 
24 
 
 
Disciplinary actions  
      
Agreement 50 3.98 4 0.948 1 78 Drop Importance 50 3.98 4 0.927 2 76 
25 
 
 
Enforcement    
      
Agreement 50 3.72 4 1.114 2 64 Drop Importance 49 3.78 4 1.055 2 67 
26 
 
 
Building trust  
      
Agreement 50 4.74 5 0.482 0 98 Retain Importance 50 4.72 5 0.449 1 1.00 
27 
 
 
Policies and procedures  
      
Agreement 50 4.12 4 0.791 1 0.78 Drop Importance 50 4.08 4 0.821 1 0.78 
28 
 
 
Periodic review of policies 
and procedures 
 
      
Agreement 50 3.92 4 0.956 2 0.66 Drop Importance 50 3.92 4 0.913 2 0.70 
29 
 
 
Pay for performance  
      
Agreement 49 3.08 3 1.175 2 0.33 Drop Importance 49 3.06 3 1.202 2 0.35 
30 Celebration  
      
Agreement 50 4.06 4 0.835 1 0.76 Drop Importance 50 3.94 4 0.835 2 0.66 
Notes.  N = the number of panel participants responding for the specific question.  σ is 
the standard deviation of the mean score.  IQR is the inter-quartile range about the 
median score. “5+4 %” is the percent of respondents that selected either strongly agree, 
agree, or very important, important. 
 
 
  Because the ultimate objective of Delphi is to determine consensus, these 
particular descriptive statistics are intended to indicate the panel’s central tendency and 
the dispersion of the opinion among the panel participants.  The mean and median are 
measures of central tendency, while the standard deviation and the inter-quartile range 
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(IQR) are measures of dispersion around those central tendencies respectively.  
Brightman and Schneider (1994) suggest the median is preferable when the number of 
outliers is sufficient to warrant evaluation of bi-modal tendencies.  Initial inspection of 
the data revealed no evidence suggesting a bi-modal behavior; however, the median and 
IQR are presented for completeness. 
 The column labeled “5+4 %” in Table 2 contains statistical information used to 
decide which practices would be carried over into the Round 3 inquiry.  In Chapter III, I 
defined the decision rule for carry over as those practices for which at least 80% of the 
participants gave scores of 4 or 5 would move to Round 3.   The “5+4 %” column lists 
the percentage of participants that selected 4 or 5 for the survey questions.   Upon 
applying the decision rule to these data, the following 12 practices were dropped from 
continued evaluation by the Delphi methodology: 
• 5. Posters, signs, banners & e-mails 
• 8. Communications accuracy 
• 13. Observations 
• 14.  Putting safety first 
• 17. Conferences 
• 18. Annual training and testing 
• 24. Disciplinary actions 
• 25. Enforcement 
• 27. Policies and procedures 
• 28. Periodic review of policies and procedures 
• 29. Pay for performance 
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• 30. Celebration 
Two additional practices, number 7, “share experiences,” and number 16, “monthly 
safety meetings,” were on the borderline and could have been dropped by strict adherence 
to the decision rule.  However, after closer examination on an individual basis, I decided 
to retain them into Round 3.  Number 7, scored only 88 and 75, and number 16, scored 
only 82 and 76, but both practices had a relatively narrow dispersion as indicated by the 
low standard deviation, thereby indicating close agreement by panel participants.   
The combination of borderline score and narrow dispersion suggested another 
round of evaluation by the full panel was in order.  The peer debriefer concurred with this 
decision and no changes were made as a result of that quality review.  The comments 
provided in Section C of the inquiry were few and inconsequential.  No new practices 
were added as a result of the comments, nor was any syntax of existing practices 
changed. 
 
Round 3 Inquiry 
The objectives of the Round 3 inquiry are not too dissimilar to the previous round 
which were to:  (a) provide the participants with sufficient feedback from the previous 
round to allow them to comprehend the analysis and the positions of the other 
participants; (b) obtain each participant’s quantifiable agreement, or disagreement, with 
practices that  remain on the list; and (c) obtain quantifiable decisions from each 
participant about how important each of the practices is for establishing or maintaining a 
positive safety culture.  The significant difference between Round 3 and the previous 
Round 2 inquiry is the feedback provided to the participants.  In Round 3, the participants 
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were informed that the number of practices has decreased from 30 to 18 as a result of 
their input, and the prior voting results of the group are included on each survey question.  
Appendix F is an example of the Round 3 inquiry provided to the participants via 
SurveyMonkeyTM. Again, the Appendix shows the complete detail for only the first 
practice, “Management Involvement and Participation.”  It begins with a statement and 
detailed definition of the practice followed by a query of the participants’ rating of 
agreement and importance using a 5-point scale.  The number of votes received in the 
prior round of inquiry is listed beside each scale descriptor so the participant can readily 
see how the panel vote was divided in the prior round.  This same line of inquiry was 
repeated for the remaining 18 practices.  The repetition is excluded from Appendix F to 
save space.  A final open-ended question is provided to give the participants an 
opportunity to suggest modifications.  The Round 3 inquiry was e-mailed to all the same 
addresses used for the previous inquiry. No delivery failures occurred.   
Fifty-six panel participants responded to the Round 3 inquiry after 5 days.  This 
was four more than responded in Round 2 indicating that at least 4 participants thought to 
be lost to attrition rejoined that panel.  I elected to wait no longer and closed the data 
collector at 56 because again it compared favorably with my attrition forecast.  As before, 
not all participants responded to all of the inquiry questions.  Four of the practices 
received responses from only 54 participants.  Actual response rates are given by “N” in 
Table 4.  The 5-point scale responses were again assigned the same numerical scores for 
computational analysis. SPSSTM was used to calculate the mean, standard deviation, 
median, IQR, and 5+4% for the Round 3 response data as done for the previous Round 2. 
In order to preserve the identity of the practices from round to round, I retained the same 
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practice numbering even though 12 practices were dropped from the set.  For that reason, 
the practice numbers in Table 4 are not continuous.  The gaps are caused by the dropped 
practices.  The Round 3 analysis, however, provided the first opportunity to  
quantitatively test for consensus, the desired outcome of the Delphi methodology.   
 
Consensus Testing: Round 3 
Two sample z test. Consensus occurs when the central tendency of the participant 
panel’s response, and the dispersion of the responses about that central tendency, both 
stabilize, that is, they do not significantly change from one round of inquiry to the next.  I 
tested for the first part of consensus definition (stability of central tendency) by 
comparing the means of each practice for equality.  The hypotheses for this test are: 
 H0: ūnr2   -   ūnr3 = 0 
 Ha: ūnr2   -   ūnr3 ≠ 0 
where ūnr2 is the mean for practice n from Round 2 and   ūnr3  is the mean for 
practice n from Round 3.   
The two-sample z test statistic for testing ūnr2   -   ūnr3 is: 
 z = (ūnr2   -   ūnr3) / [(σnr22 / Nnr2) + (σnr32 / Nnr3)]½ 
For a two-tailed test at α = 0.05, if the calculated z value exceeds the critical z = 1.96 then 
the null hypothesis must be rejected.  For this study, rejection of the null hypothesis 
indicates that consensus was not achieved.  The calculated z test statistic for each of the 
practices, and its corresponding p-values are listed in the rightmost two columns in Table 
4.  The null hypothesis was rejected for two practices, number 2, safety leadership, (z = 
2.08, p = 0.0376) and number 19, job specific training, (z = 1.97, p = 0.0488)  
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Table 4 
 
Results of Round 3 Inquiry and Comparison with Round 2 
 
Comparison of 
Means Rounds 
2 & 3 
Practice N Mean Med σ IQR 
5+4, 
% 
z 
scores 
p 
values 
1. Management Involvement 
& Participation 
 Agreement 56 4.964 5 0.186 0 100 1.85 0.0644 
 Importance 56 4.964 5 0.186 0 100 0.54 0.5892 
2. Safety Leadership 
 Agreement 56 4.25 5 0.829 1 82 2.08 0.0376 
 Importance 56 4.357 5 0.854 1 82 1.85 0.0644 
3. Management Systems 
 Agreement 54 4.241 4 0.607 1 94 0.95 0.3422 
 Importance 54 4.333 4 0.720 1 93 0.55 0.5824 
4. Management Commitment 
 Agreement 54 4.778 5 0.497 0 96 0.38 0.704 
 Importance 54 4.926 5 0.262 0 100 1.88 0.0602 
6. Atmosphere of Openness 
 Agreement 56 4.857 5 0.350 0 100 1.94 0.0524 
 Importance 56 4.821 5 0.383 0 100 1.05 0.2938 
7. Share Experiences 
 Agreement 56 4.107 4 0.795 1 86 1.42 0.1556 
 Importance 56 4.179 4 0.710 1 82 0.30 0.7642 
8. Near Miss Reviews 
 Agreement 54 4.556 5 0.685 1 89 1.54 0.1236 
 Importance 54 4.481 5 0.739 1 85 0.83 0.4066 
9. Hazard Assessment 
 Agreement 56 4.643 5 0.549 1 96 0.66 0.5092 
 Importance 56 4.607 5 0.618 1 93 0.17 0.865 
11. Audits 
 Agreement 56 4.161 4 0.701 1 86 0.68 0.4966 
 Importance 56 4.161 4 0.701 1 86 0.54 0.5892 
12. Inspections and 
Walkthroughs 
 Agreement 56 4.607 5 0.557 1 96 0.37 0.7114 
 Importance 56 4.679 5 0.538 1 96 0.69 0.4902 
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Practice N Mean Med σ IQR 
5+4, 
% 
Z 
scores 
p 
values 
15. Orientation Training 
 Agreement 54 4.704 5 0.457 1 100 0.83 0.4066 
 Importance 54 4.704 5 0.457 1 100 1.34 0.1802 
16. Monthly Safety Meetings 
 Agreement 56 4.304 4 0.679 1 91 0.20 0.8414 
 Importance 56 4.107 4 0.880 1 79 0.67 0.5028 
19. Job Specific Training 
 Agreement 56 4.786 5 0.490 1 96 1.97 0.0488 
 Importance 56 4.786 5 0.490 1 96 1.85 0.0644 
20. Training Quality 
 Agreement 56 4.018 4 0.855 1 80 1.44 0.1498 
 Importance 56 4.125 4 0.803 1 86 0.72 0.4716 
21. Employee Involvement 
 Agreement 56 4.75 5 0.509 0 96 1.09 0.2758 
 Importance 56 4.75 5 0.509 0 96 1.35 0.177 
22. Time Out 
 Agreement 56 4.607 5 0.618 1 93 0.28 0.7794 
 Importance 56 4.643 5 0.666 1 89 0.34 0.7338 
23. Performance Evaluations 
Include Safety 
 Agreement 56 4.357 4 0.854 1 82 0.23 0.818 
 Importance 56 4.429 4 0.863 1 82 1.07 0.2846 
26. Building Trust 
 Agreement 56 4.786 5 0.490 0 96 0.48 0.6312 
 Importance 56 4.857 5 0.350 0 100 1.74 0.0818 
Note.  N is the number of respondents; σ is the standard deviation of the mean; IQR is the 
interquartile range; 5+4 % is the percent of respondents that selected strongly agree, 
agree, very important, or important; Z is the resultant statistic for test of equality of the 
means for Rounds 2 and 3; p is the value for the corresponding statistical test. 
  
indicating that consensus did not exist among the panel participants for inclusion of these 
practices, based upon inequality of the mean between Rounds 2 and 3. 
 Wilcoxon non-parametric rank test.  The second part of testing for consensus, the 
stability of the dispersion around the median, is determined by the Wilcoxon non-
parametric rank test.  Appendix H is a detailed example of how this test is conducted.   
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The hypotheses for the test are: 
H0:  The two populations have equal dispersions 
Ha:  The two populations have unequal dispersions 
The calculated z values for the agreement rankings and the importance rankings were 
0.348 and 0.6011 respectively.  For a two-tailed test at α = 0.05, if the calculated z value 
exceeds the critical z = 1.96 then the null hypothesis must be rejected.  In this case the 
null hypothesis was accepted for both agreement and importance. Thus I can safely 
conclude that, based upon dispersion about the median, consensus was achieved between 
Rounds 2 and 3.  The corresponding p values for this test are listed in Table 7. 
 At this point, I had mixed results about consensus: based on the means equality 
test, 2 of the 18 practices failed consensus; based on dispersion about the median, 
consensus was strong.  For the two practices that failed consensus, the p-values (see 
Table 4) were 0.0488 and 0.0376, both of which I considered close enough to the 
threshold of 0.05 to warrant further examination.  I elected to begin this examination by 
conducting a Round 4 inquiry with the same 18 practices carried in Round 3. 
Round 4 Inquiry 
The objectives of the Round 4 inquiry were identical to those for Round 3,  (a) 
provide the participants with sufficient feedback from the previous round to allow them 
to comprehend the analysis and the positions of the other participants; (b) obtain each 
participant’s quantifiable agreement, or disagreement, with practices that remain on the 
list; and (c) obtain quantifiable decisions from each participant about how important each 
of the practices is for establishing or maintaining a positive safety culture.  Appendix G is 
an example of the Round 4 inquiry provided to the participants via SurveyMonkeyTM. 
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Again, the Appendix shows the complete detail for only the first practice “Management 
Involvement and Participation.”  This same line of inquiry was repeated for the remaining 
18 practices.  The repetition is excluded from Appendix G to again save space.  A final 
open-ended question was provided to give the participants an opportunity to suggest 
modifications.  The Round 4 inquiry was e-mailed to all the same addresses used for the 
previous inquiry.  No delivery failures occurred.   
Sixty panel participants responded to the Round 3 inquiry after 5 days.  This was 
four more than responded in Round 3 indicating that at least 4 participants rejoined that 
panel.  Again, not all participants responded to all of the inquiry questions.  Four of the 
practices received responses from only 52 participants.  Table 5 illustrates the variance in 
panel membership over the duration of all four rounds of inquiry.   
Table 5 
 
Participant Panel Populations 
 
Responses per Question 
Round of Inquiry Participants in the Round Least Most 
1 68 NA NA 
2 52 49 52 
3 56 54 56 
4 60 54 60 
 
The results of this analysis of data collected from the Round 4 inquiry are 
provided in Table 6.  The format of Table 6 is identical to previous rounds for 
comparative purposes. 
 
Consensus Testing: Round 4 
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 Two sample z test.  The calculated z test statistic for each of the practices, and its 
corresponding p-values, are listed in the rightmost two columns in Table 6.  All 
calculated values of z were less that the critical value of 1.96 for a two-tailed test at α = 
0.05.   Thus, I can conclude that consensus has been achieved based upon the equality of 
all means. 
 Wilcoxon non-parametric rank test.  The calculated z values for the agreement 
rankings and the importance rankings were 0.9082 and 0.7881 respectively; both less 
than the critical z = 1.96 for a two-tailed test at α = 0.05.  Thus, I can conclude that, based 
upon dispersion about the median, consensus was achieved between Rounds 3 and 4.  
The corresponding p values for this test are listed in Table 7. 
 A visual comparison of the z and p values in Tables 4 and 5 provide some clues as 
to why consensus was reached after Round 4.  The majority of the z scores significantly 
decreased and the majority of the p values significantly increased from Round 3 to Round 
4, which is indicative of a convergence of the opinion of the panel participants.  Round 3 
and Round 4 contained the same number (18) of practices which likely accounts for the 
convergence.  In contrast, Round 2 to Round 3 had a decrease (30 to 18) in the number of 
practices causing a dilution of the votes in the former round.  It is also possible that the 
effects of participants re-joining the panel between rounds may have had just enough 
impact on the consensus tests to change the borderline values. With consensus reached 
after Round 4, I terminated data inquiries for this study. 
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Ranking of the Practices 
 Besides a consensus list of practices that lead to a positive safety culture, the 
research data provide the opportunity to rank the practices in priority of importance.  
Some combination of both the agreement rating and the importance rating is more  
 
Figure 2. The Round 4 mean agreement rating versus the mean importance rating for 
each practice. 
 
appropriate for a practitioner than either one alone.  Figure 2 is a plot of the mean 
agreement rating versus the mean importance rating.  The near-linear relationship 
suggests little difference between the two parameters with respect to ranking.  As a result, 
I have ranked the practices according to the average of the agreement and importance 
ratings. The final rankings are shown in Table 8.  I changed the practice numbers to 
letters to distinguish its position in the rank with its former identity carried in the data 
analysis.  
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 Figure 3 shows a plot of the averaged practice mean ratings including the 95% 
statistical confidence interval.  This plot shows that some overlap of rank exists between 
adjacent practices or groups of adjacent practices; however, there is a clear distinction of 
rank from top to bottom. 
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Table 6 
 
Results of Round 4 Inquiry and Comparison with Round 3 
 
Comparison of 
Means, Rounds 
3 & 4 
5+4, 
% Practices N Mean Med σ IQR 
Z  
score 
p 
value 
1 
Management Involvement & 
Participation 
Agreement 60 4.867 5 0.499 0 0.97 1.41 0.159 
Importance 58 4.948 5 0.221 0 1.00 0.42 0.674 
2 Safety Leadership 
Agreement 55 4.218 4 0.928 1 0.82 0.19 0.849 
Importance 56 4.429 5 0.776 1 0.86 0.46 0.646 
3 Management Systems 
Agreement 54 4.278 4 0.524 1 0.96 0.34 0.734 
Importance 54 4.333 4 0.720 1 0.93 0.00 1.000 
4 Management Commitment 
Agreement 53 4.755 5 0.580 0 0.96 0.22 0.826 
Importance 53 4.868 5 0.584 0 0.98 0.66 0.509 
6 Atmosphere of Openness 
Agreement 58 4.759 5 0.702 0 0.97 0.95 0.342 
Importance 57 4.789 5 0.449 0 0.98 0.41 0.682 
7 Share Experiences 
Agreement 58 4.103 4 0.824 1 0.86 0.02 0.984 
Importance 55 4.218 4 0.706 1 0.84 0.29 0.772 
9 Near Miss Reviews 
Agreement 56 4.482 5 0.779 1 0.86 0.53 0.596 
Importance 52 4.519 5 0.720 1 0.87 0.27 0.787 
10 Hazard Assessment 
Agreement 56 4.625 5 0.696 1 0.96 0.15 0.881 
Importance 58 4.483 5 0.856 1 0.88 0.89 0.373 
11 Audits 
Agreement 58 4.103 4 0.759 1 0.83 0.42 0.674 
Importance 56 4.179 4 0.758 1 0.88 0.13 0.897 
12 
Inspections and 
Walkthroughs 
Agreement 57 4.596 5 0.617 1 0.96 0.10 0.920 
Importance 56 4.661 5 0.576 1 0.95 0.17 0.865 
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 Practices N Mean Med σ IQR 
5+4, 
% 
Z  
score 
p 
value 
15 Orientation Training 
Agreement 52 4.712 5 0.453 1 1.00 0.09 0.928 
Importance 56 4.607 5 0.618 1 0.96 0.93 0.352 
16 Monthly Safety Meetings 
Agreement 55 4.291 4 0.730 1 0.91 0.09 0.928 
Importance 56 4.089 4 0.969 1 0.79 0.10 0.920 
19 Job Specific Training 
Agreement 56 4.75 5 0.605 0 0.95 0.34 0.734 
Importance 56 4.768 5 0.500 1 0.96 0.19 0.849 
20 Training Quality 
Agreement 57 3.947 4 0.887 1 0.77 0.43 0.667 
Importance 54 4.204 4 0.620 1 0.89 0.58 0.562 
21 Employee Involvement 
Agreement 58 4.603 5 0.808 1 0.91 1.16 0.246 
Importance 58 4.724 5 0.581 0 0.97 0.25 0.803 
22 Time Out 
Agreement 55 4.6 5 0.677 1 0.93 0.06 0.952 
Importance 58 4.517 5 0.895 1 0.84 0.85 0.395 
23 
Performance Evaluations 
Include Safety 
Agreement 54 4.407 5 0.782 1 0.85 0.32 0.749 
Importance 57 4.386 5 0.874 1 0.81 0.26 0.795 
26 Building Trust 
Agreement 58 4.707 5 0.643 0 0.93 0.70 0.484 
Importance 57 4.789 5 0.521 0 0.98 0.74 0.459 
Note.  N is the number of respondents; σ is the standard deviation of the mean; IQR is the 
interquartile range; 5+4 % is the percent of respondents that selected strongly agree, 
agree, very important, or important; Z is the resultant statistic for test of equality of the 
means for Rounds 3 and 4; p is the value for the corresponding statistical test. 
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Table 7 
 
Wilcoxon Results:  Tests for Consensus 
 
 
Comparison Z score p value 
Round 2 to Round 3 
Agreement 0.348 0.9082 
Importance 0.6011 0.7881 
Round 3 to Round 4 
Agreement 0.6327 0.7673 
Importance 0.1424 0.9099 
Note.  For p values greater than 0.05, reject the alternative hypothesis and accept the null 
hypothesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter IV Conclusion 
 Both research questions set for this dissertation study were successfully answered. 
A Delphi participant panel was successfully recruited to inform this research and panel 
membership was retained at levels above what was forecasted through termination of the 
study.  Attrition was minimal.  The data was collected electronically via 
SurveyMonkeyTM while de-identification requirements were maintained.  A set of 
practices that lead to a positive safety culture were obtained and consensus regarding the 
practice set was achieved after four rounds of inquiry.  The consensus set is provided in 
rank order of importance and agreement in Table 8.  
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Table 8 
Final Consensus Practices in Rank Order  
Practice AVE Mean 
A. Management Involvement & Participation 4.91 
B. Management Commitment 4.81 
C. Atmosphere of Openness 4.77 
D. Job Specific Training 4.76 
E. Building Trust 4.75 
F. Employee Involvement 4.66 
G. Orientation Training 4.66 
H. Inspections and Walkthroughs 4.63 
I. Time Out 4.56 
J. Hazard Assessment 4.55 
K. Near Miss Reviews 4.50 
L. Performance Evaluations Include Safety 4.40 
M. Safety Leadership 4.32 
N. Management Systems 4.31 
O. Monthly Safety Meetings 4.19 
P. Share Experiences 4.16 
Q. Audits 4.14 
R. Training Quality 4.08 
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Figure 3.  The final average of Agreement and Importance mean ratings for each 
practice including the 95% confidence interval.  Refer to Table 8 for the practice 
corresponding to the letters on the abscissa.  
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CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Introduction to the Chapter 
 A positive safety culture within an organization is related to a reduction in the rate 
of occupational accidents and injuries.  However, researchers to date have been unable to 
reach a general consensus on the factor structure or the antecedents that lead to a positive 
safety culture.  Schein (1990) defines culture as the shared set of attitudes, beliefs, and 
values.  Hofstede’s (2001) onion model of organizational culture submits that values are 
at the core of organizational culture and that “practices” are the manifestation of those 
values.  The aim of this dissertation study was to identify the set of practices that are 
related to positive safety culture. 
 The literature review showed the lack of a general consensus regarding the factor 
structure of safety culture resulted from weaknesses in methodology and research 
context.  The exploratory front-end of the Delphi methodology was used in this 
dissertation research to overcome  those weaknesses. 
 In this chapter, I will discuss the findings in the context of emerging conclusions 
from the study.  The chapter begins with the outcomes related to the specific purpose of 
the study, followed by a discussion of the Delphi process and its unique contributions to 
the outcomes.  The chapter concludes with a discussion of the implications for both 
practitioners and researchers, the limitations of the study, and potential extensions for 
further research. 
Discussion of Outcomes Related to Purpose 
 The purpose of this research was to answer the following research questions: 
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Question #1:  What practices are used by the members of organizations to 
establish or maintain a positive safety culture within those organizations?  
Beginning with 275 practices offered by the 68 panel participants in the initial 
round, the list reduced to 30 candidate practices through content analysis of the raw data.   
Question #2:  Does consensus exist among a panel of safety experts for the set, or 
subset, of the practices discovered by the first research question? 
Through the implementation of the Delphi technique and the perspective of the 68 
panel participants, consensus was reached for the inclusion of 18 practices.  After four 
rounds of Delphi inquiries and analyses, the panel participants also reached consensus 
regarding the importance of these 18 practices.  The consensus practices are listed in 
Table 8. 
The differences between the individual practices within the ranking of the 18 
practices were small for adjacently ranked practices.  In fact, as many as five practices 
had statistical means that fell within the confidence intervals with each other.  However, 
over the spectrum of all 18, there is a clear hierarchy of importance. 
Consensus Practices Related to Safety Culture 
 Of the 30 practices set forth by the Round 1 inquiry, consensus was reached on 
both agreement and importance for 18 of them and final member-checking confirmed the 
18.  Panel members also indicated potential existed for merger of a few of the practices.  
However, there was no consensus as to which ones.  The following discusses the 
consensus practices. 
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Management involvement and participation.  This practice ranked highest on the 
importance and agreement scale and had the narrowest dispersion of the 18 practices 
indicating very strong consensus for its inclusion.  Participants most frequently 
characterized the practice by the cliché, “walk the talk,” meaning that safety culture 
would be established and maintained when managers at all levels personally act out all 
attributes of the established ESH activities.  Such activities include: safety meetings, 
safety program and goals development, evaluating performance metrics, audits, 
inspections, pre-startup safety reviews, job cycle checks, incident investigations, and 
wearing the appropriate personal protective equipment just like front line workers.  One 
panel participant noted “when senior management [is] involved in audits, inspections, 
and the like …there seems to be improved safety culture, as all employees see that it is 
something valued by senior leadership.”   The repeated demonstration of safety as a value 
is at the core of the Hofstede (2001) onion model that I used as the theoretical foundation 
for this study 
Management commitment.  Placing second in the ranking, this practice notes that 
two unique management functions, business planning and resource allocation, must 
equally include occupational safety as an element of the business for successful 
establishment of a safety culture.  The practice recognizes that safety goals and objectives 
cannot be realized without a success-oriented plan and the appropriate resources 
(monetary and manpower) to execute that plan.  More importantly, the inclusion of safety 
in the resource planning demonstrates to members of the organization, that safety is on 
the same level as production, service, etc.   One panel participant related “my 
management understands that preventing accidents saves money…and supporting 
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[safety] initiatives publicly makes a huge difference in whether employees pay 
attention…and takes us seriously.”  The most frequently stated portion of the definition 
of this practice was the willingness of the firm to monetarily fund the safety improvement 
initiatives. 
Atmosphere of openness, and building trust.  While these two practices were 
defined and evaluated separately by all four rounds of inquiry, their definitions are 
intertwined and with their ranking scores nearly equal, merit discussion together.  The 
definition of “atmosphere of openness” relates to promoting and conducting open 
communications throughout the organization regarding safety problems without fear of 
retaliation even for counter opinions.  Correction of problems requires a clear 
understanding of the details, the discussion of which must be free of any chilling effects.  
One panel participant noted, “allow[ing] concerns to be brought forward and addressed 
by all levels results in buy-in by the majority of the employees, which leads to a positive 
safety culture.”   
The practice of “building trust” refers to blame avoidance, coaching versus 
policing, action versus promises, and good interpersonal skills, all of which are 
antecedents to building an atmosphere of openness.  Prior research by Clarke (1998), Cox 
and Cox (1991), Lee (1998), Mearns et al. (1998), Silva et al. (2004), and Rundmo 
(2000) also found that the equivalent of both practices were present in the factor structure 
when either one appeared.   Thus, these two practices are interconnected and, from a 
practitioner’s view, may be considered as a single practice. 
Employee involvement.  The objective of this safety practice is the same as any 
generic employee involvement practice.  Involving employees in all safety related 
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activities produces more buy-in, better solutions, empowerment and self-reliance.  One 
participant related, “involving employees in audits, inspections, training, what-if 
analyses, problem solving, discussions on job scope hazards, and on special committees 
has been very successful at developing a safety mindset within their work groups.” 
Time Out.  Implementation of the “time out” practice was considered by many 
panel participants as the ultimate employee involvement.  The practice requires that all 
employees have the responsibility and authority to stop work or declare a stand down 
when a job in progress is perceived to be proceeding unsafely.  The panel participants 
unanimously noted that it is an ultimate measure of safety culture because a work 
stoppage usually incurs a cost penalty and the existence of this practice demonstrates the 
corporate value of safety over production. 
Job specific training, orientation training, and training quality.  All three of these 
practices include the common activity of training, albeit different viewpoints.  The first 
two, “job specific training” and “orientation training”, ranked in the upper one-third of 
the set of practices for several important reasons.  First, employees must possess the 
appropriate job specific knowledge and skills to perform job functions safely.  Secondly, 
their competence level is expected to be high enough, as one participant noted, "to ask the 
questions such as what could go wrong here” so hazards can be identified and mitigated 
before they cause accidents.  Emphasis on “job specific training” is regarded as the 
means to attaining the intended high levels of competence.  
“Orientation training” is the pre-requisite to the job specific training and is aimed 
at “creating value for safety for all coming into the plant” as noted by one panel 
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participant.  Orientation training is viewed as the first task for every new employee to 
complete so they are prepared for learning safety skills in the job specific training. 
Finally, “training quality” was last in the rank order of importance and the 
participants’ comments addressed typical quality issues such as objective-based training, 
periodic assessments, and real versus hypothetical cases, with emphasis on the latter by 
several participants.  One participant’s statement, “safety training must be authentic and 
truly represent what the employee observes in their workplace.  Hypothetical situations 
do little to transfer safety information” succinctly describes the training quality practice. 
While the differences in importance ranking of these three training-related 
practices appear significant, the definitions, comments, and examples provided by the 
participants suggest they are tightly linked.  “Job specific training” is the principal 
antecedent of safety culture.   However, its success requires the orientation training as a 
prerequisite and both training programs require high training quality.  Thus, for the 
practitioner, these three might well be combined into a single practice. 
Management systems, safety leadership, and performance evaluations that 
include safety.  The ranking scores for these three practices were nearly identical (4.31. 
4.32 and 4.40 respectively) and examination of the participants’ comments suggests they 
are perhaps three parts of the same practice.  The “management systems” practice was 
defined as establishing a system of corporate governance that holds safety as a corporate 
value, states a vision and belief about it, and defines the roles and expectations of all 
members of the organization regarding safety.  As one participant commented, “too often 
the safety department of a company is viewed as responsible for safety performance 
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versus the line organization.  It’s easy for the lines of responsibility to get blurred so 
senior management must address this constantly.”     
The “safety leadership” practice was defined as managers setting safety goals, 
monitoring performance against goals, and providing appropriate feedback.  One 
participant described it as, “[managers] set up goals for the safety performance of their 
departments, regions, divisions, etc.  Measurement criteria are established (lost work 
days, emergency responses, workers compensation costs, etc.) and managers are 
accountable for improvement in their areas.”  Another participant noted, “the plant 
manager has a monthly meeting…devoted to safety to track progress of safety-related 
projects, check status of leading safety indicators, and take action for not hitting targets.”  
Thus, it appears that safety leadership is merely a subpart (a role and responsibility) of 
the management systems practice.  Again, from practitioner’s view, potential exists for 
combining these into a single practice. 
The practice of “performance evaluations that include safety” is the final element 
of accountability for the previous two practices.  It is defined as adding the topic of safety 
performance relative to goals in the annual (or periodic) performance reviews for each 
employee.  A participant commented, “performance evaluations should have a defined 
component devoted to safety performance and evaluations should impact salary, bonus 
and promotion decisions.” 
Audits, hazard assessments, inspections and walkthroughs, and near miss 
reviews.  These four practices are interconnected by their common purpose which is to 
uncover and ubiquitously correct unsafe conditions or unsafe acts that could lead to 
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accidents.  Based on the participants’ comments, the differences are primarily in the 
setting, the degree of formality, and the actors involved.   
“Audits” are the most formal, comprehensive, and are conducted by trained 
auditors.  They were best defined by a participant’s comment: “A fully implemented 
auditing and incident investigation procedure which focuses on reporting of incidents 
(including near misses), root cause analysis, correction of hazards, and follow-up to 
ensure that hazards remain corrected, is a necessary attribute of any positive safety 
culture.”  Formality is achieved by conducting the audits according to a procedure and 
schedule.  The outcome is generally documented in a written report and subsequent audits 
examine the compliance with recommendation in that written report.  Over a pre-planned, 
designated time span, all parts of the organization are subjected to audits.  The auditors 
are specially qualified (often evidenced by certification) to conduct audits and may be 
part of a regulatory agency. 
“Near miss reviews” include a formalized mechanism for reporting, analyzing, 
and acting upon events for which a serious accident was just nearly missed.  Voluntary, 
no-fault, self-reporting is the initiator for a near miss review which differentiates it from 
the other three practices.  Otherwise, the rigor of the analysis and reporting is similar to 
the audit practice.  One participant wrote, “the goal is to learn from mistakes and avoid 
repeat incidents” which clarifies the purpose of near miss reviews. 
“Hazard assessments” are less formal than audits and less comprehensive.  They 
include periodic evaluation of facilities, equipment, processes or people to determine if 
changes over time have introduced new hazards.  Results are documented and changes in 
policies and procedures are implemented as necessary.  A participant’s comment, “if you 
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don’t know it’s a hazard, it cannot be corrected before an accident happens” succinctly 
describes the purpose of the practice.   Hazard assessments are usually conducted by the 
people, or their peers, who normally work on the object or process being assessed. 
“Inspection and walkthroughs” are even less formal.  They are conducted by 
managers as well as peers.  Time is allotted to just “walk around” and observe people 
working.  Deficiencies are corrected immediately, interaction is encouraged, and 
typically there is no formal reporting.  One respondent wrote, “verbal feedback is 
encouraged between fellow employees during these short review and observation periods 
so that a feeling of caring, mutual respect, and safety dependency is obtained.  The 
individuals’ [identities] are confidential and not shared with management.” 
It is worth noting that while these four practices are related by common purpose, 
they are not dependent on one another as were the training practices.  The practitioner 
might implement any one effectively.  However, this study concludes that all four are 
related to a positive safety culture. 
Monthly safety meetings.  This practice requires that all employees devote some 
amount of work time (typically 1 hour) every month (or some other appropriate time 
period) to assemble and engage in a dialogue about safety.  Topics vary and might 
include refresher training, review of new safety practices, review of accident 
investigations, celebration of successes, etc.  Several participants found it important not 
to structure these meetings but rather address the contemporary issues. 
Share experiences.  The objective of this practice is to encourage ongoing 
communications in all directions about personal safety experiences.  Participants gave 
examples ranging from employees making somewhat formal testimonial presentations at 
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one end of the spectrum to impromptu humorous e-mails about safety from the CEO at 
the other end. 
Comparison to Prior Research 
 The underlying justification for this dissertation research was the fact that prior 
research could not reach a consensus on the factor structure of safety culture.  While not 
in consensus, those researchers did identify sets of practices for particular domains of 
their respective studies.  The following discussion compares my conclusions with those 
of other researchers. 
 I selected 21 studies from the literature to compare with the results of this study.  
These studies are some of the more frequently cited in the safety culture research stream 
and were included by Cooper (2000) and Clarke (2000) in their work to define the state-
of-the-art in safety culture research.  The results of my comparison are illustrated in 
Table 9. The letters in the header of Table 9 correspond to the letter designation of my 
final results in Table 8.  Denoted by “X” are those prior research studies that have found 
a factor similar or identical to a practice found in this study.  
Table 9 
 
Comparison to Selected Prior Studies 
 
Study Practice* A B C D E F G H I J K L M N  O P Q R 
Brown and 
Holmes 
(1986) 
 
X X                 
Cheyne, et 
al. (1998) 
 
 X X   X  X X    X      
Clarke 
(1998) 
 
X  X  X X  X X    X      
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Study Practice* A B C D E F G H I J K L M N  O P Q R 
Cooper 
and 
Phillips 
(1994) 
 
 X     X       X    X 
Cox and 
Cox 
(1991) 
 
  X  X X   X    X X     
Cox, et al. 
(1998) 
 
     X X      X X    X 
Coyle, et 
al. (1995)  
 
     X X      X X    X 
DeJoy, et 
al. (2004) 
 
 X            X     
Diaz and 
Cabrera 
(1997) 
 
 X   X    X     X     
Fang, et al. 
(2006) 
 
 X   X X X X     X X    X 
Farington-
Darby 
(2005) 
 
X X X   X X  X    X     X 
Glendon 
and 
Litherland 
(2001) 
 
X  X   X   X X   X X     
Lee (1998) X X X  X X X  X    X X    X 
Mearns, et 
al. (1998)  
 
 X X  X X   X    X X     
Mohamed 
(2002) 
 
X X X   X   X    X X     
Niskanen 
(1994) 
 
X    X   X X          
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Study Practice* A B C D E F G H I J K L M N  O P Q R 
Fernandez-
Muniz, et 
al. (2007) 
 
 X   X X  X     X X     
O’Toole 
(2002) 
 
X X    X X      X     X 
Silva, et al. 
(2004) 
 
 X X  X X X  X    X X    X 
Rundmo 
(2000) 
 
 X X  X    X     X     
Zohar 
(1980) 
 X   X  X  X     X    X 
Note.  * A = management involvement & participation; B = management commitment; C 
= atmosphere of openness; D = job specific training; E = building trust; F = employee 
involvement; G =orientation training; H = inspections and walkthroughs; I = time out; J = 
hazard assessment; K = near miss reviews; L = performance evaluations include safety; 
M = safety leadership; N = management systems; O = monthly safety meetings; P = share 
experiences; Q = audits; R = training quality 
 
 
 
 Overlap between this dissertation study and the selected 21 studies occurred for 
12 of the 18 practices identified in this study.  The six practices not clearly coincident 
with prior research include: job specific training, near miss reviews, performance 
evaluations include safety, monthly safety meetings, sharing experiences, and audits.  
One additional practice, hazard assessments, appeared in only one of the 21 studies.  The 
reason for the six non-coincident practices is not readily apparent and is a subject for 
further research.  The 12 practices that did overlap appeared with varying frequency from 
as much as 15 times for two of the practices identified in this study. 
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Usage of the Delphi Methodology 
 A critical factor of this research was the use of the Delphi methodology.  It 
provided the “exploratory” research component necessary to compensate for 
shortcomings in previous research on safety culture.  These shortcomings mainly 
included biases introduced by a priori knowledge of the researcher, use of replicated 
survey instruments, and the need for approaching the subject from a broader perspective.  
The experiences using the Delphi method merit discussion. 
 
 The Participant Panel 
 Delbecq et al. (1975), Keeney, Hasson, and McKenna (2001), Pasukeviciute and 
Roe (2001), and Powell (2003) note that panel member selection is critical for the 
adequate validity and reliability of the Delphi methodology.  Most important is the level 
of expertise and willingness to commit to the lengthy process. I engaged the assistance of 
a national trade association, the National Safety Council, for pursing panel members.  
Their large database of members with experience and zeal, combined with their brand 
attached to the introduction, facilitated swift assembly of a model panel. Attrition rates 
were only ~15% from start-to-finish compared with 60% typically.  Turnaround times 
were 10 days for Round 1, and 5 days each for Rounds 2, 3, and 4, compared to typically 
30 days and 15 days respectively. 
 
SurveyMonkeyTM 
 Data collection was accomplished almost exclusively by using SurveyMonkeyTM 
a web-based electronic data collection system.  It proved to be accurate, time-saving, and 
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effective for maintaining confidentiality of the participant responses.  However, some 
tradeoffs arise when using SurveyMonkeyTM, specifically for Delphi methodologies.  On 
the positive side, “survey fatigue” is the most prominent cause of attrition in Delphi and 
the web-based nature of the system makes it more responder-friendly.  Prolonged 
analysis between rounds of inquiry, another cause of increased attrition, is effectively 
minimized with the formats of the data collectors in SurveyMonkeyTM.  On the negative 
side, it is normally more cost effective than postal mailings; however, the required de-
identification of responses combined with the need to maintain e-mail addresses of the 
participants for multiple rounds of inquiry necessitated higher cost subscription levels.  
On the whole, the tradeoffs are still in favor of using SurveyMonkeyTM. 
 
De-identified Data 
 Research for dissertations is typically conducted with the data de-identified so as 
to hasten and streamline the Internal Review Board (IRB) approval processes.  De-
identification means that there is no reasonable way to correlate the sample participants’ 
identities with their responses.  This presents a unique challenge for the Delphi 
methodology because multiple rounds of inquiry necessitates that the principal 
investigator know the identities of the panel members.   Without that knowledge it is not 
possible to query the same participants each time.  SurveyMonkeyTM accommodates de-
identification rather neatly by partitioning research data separately from e-mail addresses 
which allows consistent sampling.  However, de-identification in general, whatever way 
it is accomplished, limits the research options with Delphi.  For example, tardy panel 
participants cannot be individually reminded of the need to hasten responses.  Also with 
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de-identification, the demographic profiles become blurred after the first round of inquiry 
because attrition will change the panel makeup.  Therefore, demographic dependencies 
cannot be measured.  In addition, follow-ups for clarification of the open-ended questions 
are not possible.  As a result, my recommendation is to conduct Delphi-based research 
with identities known by the investigator even though it requires the more rigorous path 
through the IRB. 
 
Peer Debriefing and Member Checking 
 Peer debriefing was conducted between rounds and provided valuable insights 
into the conduct of the research.  Between Rounds 1 and 2, the peer debrief led me to 
reconfigure the initial list of practices from 28 to 30 by further sub-dividing two 
practices.  One of these practices ultimately was included in the final list of 18 consensus 
practices. 
 Member checking was accomplished by feedback embedded in the round of 
inquiry and solicitation of open-ended commentary in each and every round.  Response to 
the open-ended comment opportunities was extremely minimal.  It is difficult to 
determine if the lack of comment abundance was the result of pervasive agreement with 
my analysis, apathy, or survey fatigue.  Future users of Delphi should consider making 
the member checking a higher priority. 
 
Limitations of this Study 
 As previously discussed, de-identification of the data limits the ability for the 
researcher to fine-tune the input.  Intuitively, it appears to have had little material impact 
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on the outcome of this research.  However, it is worth minimizing the potential risk in 
future research by maintaining confidential identities and obtaining permission from the 
participants to do so. 
 The pool of candidates for recruitment of the participants was mainly focused in 
the southeastern United States.  A broader geographical sample would provide more 
widely generalizable results.  
 
Implications for Practitioners 
 I concluded this study with a set of 18 organizational practices that lead to a 
positive safety culture. This set of practices was arrived at by consensus of a panel of 
occupational safety experts.  Knowledge of these organizational practices can provide the 
tools for a firm’s leadership to manage its exposure to the risk of occupational accidents 
and injuries without constant command and control.  As workers become more singular 
and remote (e.g., telecommuting, at-home workers, on-the-road workers, etc.), command 
and control tactics used to influence behavior become less viable, making it necessary to 
rely more upon instilled cultures. 
 
Implications for Researchers 
 This study provides a demonstration of the Delphi methodology used to reduce 
bias resulting from researchers’ a priori knowledge.  Such bias is typically influential 
when random sample surveys are used.  Researchers may want to consider using Delphi 
when faced with bias possibilities.  In the case of the subject of this research, such biases 
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may have contributed to the lack of a general consensus regarding the factor structure of 
safety culture.  
Potential Extensions of this Research 
Replicating the results of this study using a different panel of participants would 
increase the external validity and generalizability of the results.  Replications should be 
conducted without de-identification to measure variance resulting from the panel profile. 
 This study may be one of the earliest studies to use a Delphi methodology for 
examining the safety culture.  Delphi methodologies should be considered when 
exploring organizational sub-cultures beyond safety, e.g., innovation, ethics, quality, 
green, etc. 
 Hofstede (2001) demonstrated that significant cultural variances occur when 
crossing international borders.  Intuition suggests those same differences would apply to 
the practices that produce a positive safety culture.  Therefore, it would be valuable to 
conduct this same research with participant panels from different countries or regions.  
The results may be valuable for firms making forays offshore.  
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Appendix A 
 
Cooperative Agreement for Participant Recruitment 
 
 
 
Authorization 
 
 
Saturday, January 19, 2013 02:34 PM 
Colleen Eubanks [colleen@palmettoehs.com] 
 
To: Andrew Cwalina 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Andy,  
 
For the purpose of conducting the described safety culture research, you are 
authorized to recruit survey respondents from the e-mail addressees provided 
directly and from posting of the link on my firm’s website, blog page, and 
Facebook page. 
 
Colleen K. Eubanks, CIH, CSP 
Palmetto EHS, LLC 
803.462.4404 (Phone) 
803.462.4408 (Fax) 
803.260.3202 (Mobile) 
www.PalmettoEHS.com 
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Appendix B   
 
Introduction and Recruitment Letter 
 
 
Dear Participant, 
 
Thank you for considering participation in this research study.  This study is being 
undertaken as partial fulfillment of the dissertation requirements for the degree of Doctor 
of Business Administration through Nova Southeastern University, Fort Lauderdale, 
Florida.   
 
The purpose of this research study is two-fold: first to determine the practices 
used by organizations to establish or maintain a positive safety culture, and second, to 
determine if there is a consensus regarding those practices that are essential to a positive 
safety culture.  Organizational “practices” are those things that may be done, or said, or 
written, or communicated, or displayed, or affirmed, and which have a positive influence 
on safety within the organization.   
 
This study will be conducted using the Delphi method, a multiple-part survey 
technique for determining consensus around a particular topic. You will receive at least 2 
additional surveys after this one over the next two months.  Your participation is 
expected to require no more than 25 minutes total for all parts over the next 2 months. 
Your responses to this survey will be de-identified by the survey software such that your 
opinions will remain anonymous throughout the study. The anonymous nature of this 
Delphi process allows all participants to have an equal voice without individual or group 
pressure.     
 
Your participation in this study is totally voluntary and anonymous.  There is no 
compensation for participating.  A summary of the results will be provided to you upon 
your request after project completion.  You may find the results have some practical 
value for your workplace. 
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  If you are willing to participate in this study as a Delphi panel member, please 
complete the remainder of this survey by clicking HERE.  By entering this survey, your 
consent to participate is implied and you will receive subsequent surveys as described 
above.  Again, this is totally voluntary and you may exit the study at any time.  If you 
have any questions regarding this survey, or the research study in general, please do not 
hesitate to contact me, or my research committee chairperson. 
 
My thanks in advance for your participation 
 
Andy Cwalina 
Principal Investigator, Nova Southeastern University 
803-649-7064 or cwalina@nova.edu 
 
Dr. Regina Greenwood, chairperson 
800-672-7223 
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Appendix C 
 
Round 1 Inquiry 
 
Please provide up to seven (7) practices that you either use, or you have observed being 
used, to establish or maintain a positive safety culture. 
 
PRACTICES are those things that are done, said, written, communicated, displayed, or 
affirmed and which have a positive influence on the safety of the organization. 
 
Name the practices with a single word or short phrase in the boxes on the left.  Then, as 
necessary, please provide a more detailed description of that practice, including 
examples, in the corresponding boxes on the right. 
 
Click the "done" button at the end when you have completed your contribution. 
 
 
Practice Description, including examples of the practice 
1. 
 
 
 
 
2. 
 
 
 
 
3. 
 
 
 
 
4. 
 
 
 
 
5. 
 
 
 
 
6. 
 
 
 
 
7. 
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Demographic Information 
 
2. Which of the following best describes your current assignment?  Check (√) all that 
apply. 
 
___ Safety Professional 
___Auditor or Regulator 
___Consultant 
___Manager 
___Other, specify__________________ 
 
 
3. If a Safety Professional, Auditor, Regulator, or Consultant, do you hold certification? 
 
___Yes 
___No 
 
 
4. If a consultant, how many clients have you counseled?  
 
___less than 3 
___more than 3 
 
 
5.  If an auditor or regulator, how many audits, inspections, investigations or other 
oversight activities have you conducted? 
 
___less than 3 
___more than 3 
 
 
6. If a Manager, how many people report to you, directly and indirectly? 
 
___ Less than 10 
___ 11 to 100 
___ More than 100 
 
 
7. How long have you been in this assignment? 
 
___ Less than 1 year 
___ 1 to 5 years 
___ More than 5 years 
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___ I would prefer not to answer 
 
 
8. What is your age (last birthday)? 
 
___ Less than 25 years old 
___26 to 35 years old 
___36 to 45 years old 
___46 to 55 years old 
___56 to 65 years old 
___over 65 years old 
___ I would prefer not to answer 
 
 
9. What is your gender? 
 
___ Male 
___ Female 
___ I would prefer not to answer 
 
 
10. Please provide your e-mail address: 
 
______________________________ 
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Appendix D 
 
Data Analysis Example: 
 
Raw Textual Data from the Open-ended Questions in Round 1 Inquiry Synthesized 
to Form the First Cut of Organizational Practices for the Broad Category of 
“Management” 
 
 The Round 1 inquiry requested the respondents to provide up to seven practices 
that lead to a positive safety culture.  The inquiry requested a short practice descriptor, 
i.e. a single word or short phrase along with an attendant detailed description and 
example.  While the number of entries was limited to seven, there was no word-count 
limit on the detailed description.  Table D.1 shows the format of the collected data.  The 
leftmost column is the sequential number assigned by the SurveyMonkeyTM collector; the 
second column is the short practice descriptor; and the rightmost column is the attendant 
detailed description.  Note that this is an example of just one of the broad categories. 
There was a total of 13 broad categories (see Table 2) so the example illustrated in this 
Appendix was repeated 12 more times. 
 Table D.1 is the output of a computer-assisted textual analysis for the broad theme 
of “management.” After removal of duplicates and frivolous responses, 30 items 
remained for the next phase of analysis.  This second phase of analysis consisted of 
disaggregating the text into stand-alone phrases, sorting the phrases into like subject bins, 
and then re-aggregating the phrases into a composite sense-making definition.  The 
disaggregation is illustrated in Table D.1 by typographical distinctions: underscoring, 
italicizing, bolding, and scripting.  In the actual analysis, I produced large Table top 
118 
 
chart-maps and used color-coding (not reproducible here) to perform the disaggregation 
and re-composition 
 Table D.2 illustrates the re-composition of each distinctive typographical category 
into a sense-making definition.  The practice descriptor was selected based on a visual 
majority of the times the phraseology was associated with the disaggregated parts.  Table 
D.2 was used as the basis for constructing the Round 2 Inquiry. 
 
 
Table D.1 
 
Raw Text Data: Thematic Analysis of the “Management” Broad Category 
 
No. Practice Detailed description and examples 
2 Senior management 
commitment AND 
participation 
 The ranking manager must demonstrate his/her 
commitment to worker safety & health through active 
participation in the EHS process. delegating this 
responsibility will result in a failure of the system as what 
is important to THE manager is important to everyone else. 
If the ranking manager does not participate then neither 
will middle managers and supervisors. 
    
6 Consistent message 
delivered about safety is 
first priority. 
 Staff members in the plant all have safety objectives 
around accident frequencies and employee participation in 
safety. They have communicated to front line supervisors 
they are serious about safety and hold the departments 
accountable. 
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No. Practice Detailed description and examples 
8 Management support  Management support is needed from the highest 
level in the company and at the individual 
locations. This must be spoken and reinforced with 
examples that demonstrate their support frequently. 
    
9 Management 
commitment 
 Must be more than “we are going to comply with 
OSHA” my management understands that preventing 
accidents saves money; as a regulatory agency our 
management believes we should hold ourselves to the 
same standard as the regulated community; funds to 
purchase the best equipment. I make may management 
look good and they fully support me. 
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No. Practice Detailed description and examples 
20 Management/Company 
commitment 
 The common theme I have seen across the various 
organizations that have a positive safety culture is 
management commitment to the safety and overall 
well-being of their employees.      Everyone is looking 
for the magic bullet to make companies safer, the 
latest program, the latest mantra, the lasest 
buzzword.  Call safety a priority or a value, call 
your program behavior based or people based, 
without the commitment of the company and 
management, the rest is just smoke & mirrors, and 
the employees always know it.    Once your 
company is TRULY committed, you can use 
whatever buzzword or program you choose, so long as 
it fits the organizational and personal culture. 
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No. Practice Detailed description and examples 
21 Management Leadership  Signed written safety management plan  Publish the plan  
Lead safety culture/participate in activities  Show safety as 
part of overall business success 
    
31 Management 
involvement 
 Management must be involved, to the extent possible, in 
developing and reinforcing the local safety culture. the best 
Behavior Based Safety Program was headed by the 
Production Manager. This demonstrates that it is not just 
another weird safety professional program. 
    
32 Management Safety 
Goals 
 Employers set up goals for managers for the safety 
performance of their departments, regions, divisions, etc.  
Measurement criteria are established (lost work days, 
EMR, Workers compensation costs), and managers are 
given responsibility to manage improvement in their areas 
of responsibility. 
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No. Practice Detailed description and examples 
33 Management shows their 
commitment 
 When middle-level management shows a commitment to 
safety by practicing it themselves and seeking the safety 
office's input before taking on a project, it really shows in 
the employee's behavior. E.g. when our supervisors 
expect their folks to wear respirators and they do it 
themselves, the employees wear their respirators even 
when no one is watching.    When upper-level 
management shows a commitment to safety by 
adequately funding and staffing the safety office, and 
supporting our initiatives publicly, it makes a huge 
difference in whether the middle management and 
employees pay attention to our advice.  When we got an 
increased budget, one-time funding to implement a 
major program, and an additional employee, all the 
sudden depts. that used to scoff at us started to take us 
more seriously. 
    
34 Manager communication  This is during a job when a manager communicates with a 
worker to ensure the job is proceeding as expected. 
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No. Practice Detailed description and examples 
35 Model the Way  Leaders understand that their behavior is scrutinized by the 
workforce, and ensure that they act safely and demonstrate 
interest in safety improvements. 
    
36 Include all employees in 
some safety activity led 
by management. 
 Safety activities include meetings, incident investigations, 
audits, safety program development and execution, pre-
startup safety reviews, and job cycle checks, among others.  
These can not be delegated to low level employees without 
management leadership.  Managers must be seen as 
leading these activities. 
    
37 management leadership  In regards to safety, management must lead, walk the walk 
and talk the talk, safety must be a priority not lip service 
    
38 Management 
commitment to policy 
through practice 
 All managers wear safety glasses when required. 
    
39 Management 
commitment 
 Upper site management and corporate management 
support of the safety process and safety related 
activities.  This is generally demonstrated by budget 
and time resources allocated for safety, and when 
management has a visible but meaningful role in the 
process. 
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No. Practice Detailed description and examples 
40 Managers giving time 
and effort to safety 
 
 
    
55 Integrated Safety 
Management System 
 A formal process that identifies management as the 
"owner" of safety and as such presents a beliefs and 
vision statement around safety as corporate values.  
The top manager chairs a steering committee that 
defines the roles and responsibilities . 
    
95 Establish a statement 
of policy on safety by 
top management and 
follow it. 
 It is necessary that top management describe in 
words the policy of the organization with regard to 
safety and then demonstrate their own commitment 
to following it. 
    
172 Management leadership  In regards to safety, management must lead, walk the walk 
and talk the talk, safety must be a priority not lip service 
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No. Practice Detailed description and examples 
175 Inclusion of safety in 
Corporate values 
 Corporate Values include:  Serve our communities  
Achieve  Communicate openly and honestly  
Respect diversity and care for each other  Excel in 
customer service and safety  Do what is right 
    
176 Senior management 
involvement 
 When senior management are involved in audits, 
inspections, and the like and routinely evaluate metrics 
around safety, lead by example, etc., there seems to be 
improved safety culture, as all employees see that it 
is something valued by senior leadership. 
    
194 Set expectations  If people don't understand what's expected with respect to 
safety, then how can they participate? 
    
195 Clearly define who is 
responsible for safety 
 to often the safety (ESH) department of a company 
is viewed as responsible for safety performance versus 
the line organization.  its easy for the lines of 
responsibility to get blurred so senior management 
must address this constantly 
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No. Practice Detailed description and examples 
    
197 Safety/Health Policy 
Statement 
 Developed Safety/Health Policy Statement which 
outlines roles/responsibilities of all levels of 
organization. 
    
198 R2A2  Roles, responsibilities, authorities and 
accountabilities are clear, understood, implemented 
and evaluated to ensure these are conducted at all 
levels of the organization 
    
200 Management 
commitment 
 Leaders need to walk the walk and talk the talk. 
    
204 Line Managers are 
responsible for safety, 
not the safety 
professionals 
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No. Practice Detailed description and examples 
209 Safety Targets  Developed safety targets which are now tracked, 
measured, and reported in the same manner as production, 
quality, cost, and delivery. 
    
217 Leadership setting the 
example 
 I've seen the safety culture of an organization go from 
"world class" to below average in a short 90 day period 
when the infusion of new leadership and direct repots felt 
they did not have to follow the rules and procedures that 
were part of the previous companies culture for achieving 
safety excellence 
    
219 Safety Steering 
Committee 
 Monthly Vice President Safety Steering Committee 
Meeting designed to review safety performance with core 
stakeholders, in a much more working group environment. 
Note.  Textual descriptions are assigned to one of four groups (see Table D.2) as 
designated by underscore, italicization, script font, or bold font.  This Table only 
represents the broad category of management.  Twelve additional broad categories were 
analyzed similarly. 
 
 Table D.2 contains the re-composition of the distinguished phrases in Table D.1.  
The phrases were assembled into four like-content bins and a composite definition was 
synthesized to capture the essential meaning of the phrases. The practice descriptor (left 
hand column) was based on a majority association from the raw data.  The typological 
distinctions have been carried into this Table to illustrate the procedure used and flow of 
information.  Peer debriefing was conducted with the color-coded Table-top charts and 
the content of Table D.2 was carried into Round 2 for evaluation by the Delphi panel.  
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Similar results were produced for the remaining 12 broad categories and are summarized 
in Table 2. 
 
 
Table D.2 
 
Re-composition of “Management” Thematic Category Analysis 
 
Practice Re-constructed Description 
Management Involvement 
and Participation 
 Walk the talk.  Managers at all levels are involved in 
all EHS activities such as safety meetings, safety 
program  & goals development, evaluating 
performance metrics, audits, inspections, pre-startup 
safety reviews, job cycle checks, incident 
investigations, and wearing the appropriate personal 
protective equipment just like front line workers. 
   
Safety Leadership   Managers set safety goals and objectives for accident 
frequencies and employee participation in safety 
activities, including measurement criteria for 
performance against those goals, and communicates 
the goals and performance frequently to the entire 
organization 
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Practice Re-constructed Description 
Management 
Commitment 
 Management makes accident reduction an integral 
part of the business plan by allocating sufficient 
budget and manpower resources to support 
attainment of the safety goals and objectives. 
   
Management Systems  A system of corporate governance exists that 
defines and owns safety as a corporate value, 
states a vision and belief about the value of 
safety, and defines the roles and expectations of 
all members for safety.  
Note.  Underscoring, Italicization, Bolding, and Scripting correspond to the thematic 
analysis from Table D.1. 
 
  
130 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX E 
 
 
 
ROUND 2 INQUIRY 
  
131 
 
APPENDIX E 
 
ROUND 2 INQUIRY 
 
Note For this Appendix 
This Appendix provides an example of type and format of questions used in the 
Round 2 inquiry.  To conserve space, details are provided for only one of the 30 practices 
that were actually contained in the Round 2 inquiry.  Only the titles of the practices 2 
through 30 are shown below; however, the question formats, including the 5-point scales, 
for each subsequent practice were identical to practice 1.  The descriptions and 
frequencies for practices 2 through 30 were extracted from Table 2. 
 
Introduction Letter for Round 2 Inquiry 
Greetings Research Participant, 
Thank you for completing the Round 1 survey for the research study to determine 
the organizational practices that lead to a positive safety culture.  As promised, there are 
multiple parts to this research and the purpose of this e-mail is to launch the Round 2 
survey.  This survey is all multiple-choice and should require about 15 minutes of your 
time.  
  You are one of 68 participants in the study.  Nearly 300 practices were submitted, 
and through combination and clustering, I have collapsed the number down to 30 that are 
part of this survey.  In this Round 2, I will be asking if you agree with the 30 practices, 
and how important you think they are.  The last question in this survey provides space for 
optional comments if you should have any.  Otherwise, all questions are multiple-choice. 
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Begin the survey by clicking HERE.  Feel free to contact me by reply to this e-mail. 
 
Best regards, 
 
Andy  
 
Andy Cwalina, Principal Investigator 
Nova Southeastern University 
803-649-7064, cwalina@nova.edu 
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The Survey 
 
 
Practice:  1. Management Involvement and Participation 
 
 
Section A.  The following organizational practice "Management Involvement and 
Participation" was referenced by 11 study participants. 
 
Management Involvement and Participation:  Walk the talk.  Managers at all levels are 
involved in all S&H activities such as safety meetings, safety program  & goals 
development, evaluating performance metrics, audits, inspections, pre-startup safety 
reviews, job cycle checks, incident investigations, and wearing the appropriate personal 
protective equipment just like front line workers. 
 
Do you agree that this practice leads to a positive safety culture?  Indicate your position 
below 
 
___ STRONGLY AGREE 
___ AGREE 
___ NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE 
___ DISAGREE 
___ STRONGLY DISAGREE 
 
Please provide a short explanation if you have selected “Strongly Disagree” 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Section B.  Now please indicate how important the practice of "Management Involvement 
and Participation" is to a positive safety culture. 
 
___ VERY IMPORTANT 
___ IMPORTANT 
___NEITHER IMPORTANT NOR UNIMPORTANT 
___UNIMPORTANT 
___VERY UNIMPORTANT 
 
Please provide a short explanation if you have selected “Very Unimportant” 
________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Practice:  2. Safety leadership  
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Practice:  3. Management Systems 
Practice:  4. Management Commitment 
Practice:  5. Posters, Signs, Banners and E-mails 
Practice:  6. Atmosphere of Openness 
Practice:  7. Share Experiences 
Practice:  8. Communications Accuracy 
Practice:  9. Near Miss Reviews 
Practice:  10. Hazard Assessments 
Practice:  11. Audits 
Practice:  12. Inspections and Walkthroughs 
Practice:  13. Observations 
Practice:  14. Putting Safety First 
Practice:  15. Orientation Training 
Practice:  16. Monthly Safety Meetings 
Practice:  17. Conference Attendance 
Practice:  18. Annual Training and Testing 
Practice:  19. Job Specific Training 
Practice:  20. Training Quality 
Practice:  21. Employee Involvement 
Practice:  22. Time Out 
Practice:  23. Performance Evaluations Include Safety 
Practice:  24. Disciplinary Actions 
Practice:  25. Enforcement 
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Practice:  26. Building Trust 
Practice:  27. Policy and Procedures Available 
Practice:  28. Periodic Review of Policies and Procedures 
Practice:  29. Pay For Performance 
Practice:  30. Celebrations 
 
Section C: Missing Practices. If you feel that an important practice has not been included 
on the above list, please add it below: 
Single word or short phrase:________________________________________________ 
Detailed description including examples: 
_________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Additional Comments (optional) 
_______________________________________________ 
 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
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Appendix F 
 
Round 3 Inquiry 
 
Greetings Research Participant, 
 
Thank you for completing the surveys for Rounds 1 and/or 2 for the research 
study to determine the organizational practices that lead to a positive safety culture.  As 
you know there are multiple parts to this research and the purpose of this e-mail is to 
launch the third survey.  This survey is similar to the previous, but much shorter and 
should require only about 5 minutes of your time.    
 
The first “introduction” page of the survey explains how this survey differs from 
the previous ones.  Please read it carefully. 
 
Begin the survey by clicking HERE. 
 
Feel free to contact me by reply to this e-mail 
 
Best regards, 
 
Andy  
 
Andy Cwalina, Principal Investigator 
Nova Southeastern University 
803-649-7064, cwalina@nova.edu 
 
 
Round 3 Introduction 
 
Thanks for entering the survey. 
 
This 3rd round of the survey looks very, very similar to the previous round with TWO 
exceptions: 
 
First, it’s shorter, and should take less time.  In the previous survey there were 30 
practices.  You and the other participants found overwhelming support for only 18 of 
those practices.  Therefore, the remaining 12 have been eliminated from the study. 
 
Second, you get to see the opinions of all the other participants, while you’re making 
your selection this time.  For each multiple choice question, the previous votes of all 
participants are shown.   
 
Thanks again, and click the Next button below to get started. 
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1.  Management Involvement and Participation 
 
Definition:  Walk the talk.  Managers at all levels are involved in all S&H activities such 
as safety meetings, safety program  & goals development, evaluating performance 
metrics, audits, inspections, pre-startup safety reviews, job cycle checks, incident 
investigations, and wearing the appropriate personal protective equipment just like front 
line workers. 
 
Do you agree that this practice leads to a positive safety culture?  Indicate your position 
below 
 
___ STRONGLY AGREE (45 votes in previous round) 
___ AGREE (7 votes in previous round) 
___ NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE (0 votes in previous round) 
___ DISAGREE (0 votes in previous round) 
___ STRONGLY DISAGREE (0 votes in previous round) 
 
Please provide a short explanation if you have selected “Strongly Disagree” 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Now please indicate how important the practice of "Management Involvement and 
Participation" is to a positive safety culture. 
 
___ VERY IMPORTANT (49 votes in previous round) 
___ IMPORTANT (3 votes in previous round) 
___NEITHER IMPORTANT NOR UNIMPORTANT (0 votes in previous round) 
___UNIMPORTANT (0 votes in previous round) 
___VERY UNIMPORTANT (0 votes in previous round) 
 
Please provide a short explanation if you have selected “Very Unimportant” 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Practice:  2. Safety leadership  
Practice:  3. Management Systems 
Practice:  4. Management Commitment 
Practice:  5. Atmosphere of Openness 
Practice:  6. Share Experiences 
Practice:  7. Near Miss Reviews 
Practice:  8. Hazard Assessments 
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Practice:  9. Audits 
Practice:  10. Inspections and Walkthroughs 
Practice:  11. Orientation Training 
Practice:  12. Monthly Safety Meetings 
Practice:  13. Job Specific Training 
Practice:  14. Training Quality 
Practice:  15. Employee Involvement 
Practice:  16. Time Out 
Practice:  17. Performance Evaluations Include Safety 
Practice:  18. Building Trust 
 
 
Additional Comments (optional) 
_______________________________________________ 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
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Appendix G 
 
Round 4 Inquiry 
 
Greetings Research Participant, 
 
Thank you for completing the surveys for Rounds 1, 2, and 3 for the research 
study to determine the organizational practices that lead to a positive safety culture.  As 
you know there are multiple parts to this research and the purpose of this e-mail is to 
launch what will most likely be the last survey.  This survey is identical in format to the 
previous one; only the vote numbers have changed. 
 
Begin the survey by clicking HERE. 
 
Feel free to contact me by reply to this e-mail 
 
Best regards, 
 
Andy  
 
Andy Cwalina, Principal Investigator 
Nova Southeastern University 
803-649-7064, cwalina@nova.edu 
 
 
Round 4 Introduction 
 
Thanks for entering the survey. 
 
As in previous rounds, you get to see the opinions of all the other participants, while 
you’re making your selection this time.  For each multiple choice question, the previous 
votes of all participants are shown.   
 
Thanks again, and click the Next button below to get started. 
 
 
2.  Management Involvement and Participation 
 
Definition:  Walk the talk.  Managers at all levels are involved in all S&H activities such 
as safety meetings, safety program  & goals development, evaluating performance 
metrics, audits, inspections, pre-startup safety reviews, job cycle checks, incident 
investigations, and wearing the appropriate personal protective equipment just like front 
line workers. 
 
Do you agree that this practice leads to a positive safety culture?  Indicate your position 
below 
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___ STRONGLY AGREE (54 votes in previous round) 
___ AGREE (2 votes in previous round) 
___ NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE (0 votes in previous round) 
___ DISAGREE (0 votes in previous round) 
___ STRONGLY DISAGREE (0 votes in previous round) 
 
Please provide a short explanation if you have selected “Strongly Disagree” 
________________________________________________________________________
__ 
________________________________________________________________________
__ 
 
 
Now please indicate how important the practice of "Management Involvement and 
Participation" is to a positive safety culture. 
 
___ VERY IMPORTANT (54 votes in previous round) 
___ IMPORTANT (2 votes in previous round) 
___NEITHER IMPORTANT NOR UNIMPORTANT (0 votes in previous round) 
___UNIMPORTANT (0 votes in previous round) 
___VERY UNIMPORTANT (0 votes in previous round) 
 
Please provide a short explanation if you have selected “Very Unimportant” 
________________________________________________________________________
__ 
________________________________________________________________________
__ 
 
 
Practice:  2. Safety leadership  
Practice:  3. Management Systems 
Practice:  4. Management Commitment 
Practice:  5. Atmosphere of Openness 
Practice:  6. Share Experiences 
Practice:  7. Near Miss Reviews 
Practice:  8. Hazard Assessments 
Practice:  9. Audits 
Practice:  10. Inspections and Walkthroughs 
Practice:  11. Orientation Training 
Practice:  12. Monthly Safety Meetings 
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Practice:  13. Job Specific Training 
Practice:  14. Training Quality 
Practice:  15. Employee Involvement 
Practice:  16. Time Out 
Practice:  17. Performance Evaluations Include Safety 
Practice:  18. Building Trust 
 
 
Additional Comments (optional) 
_______________________________________________ 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
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Appendix H 
 
Example of Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test for Dispersion Equality  
of Two Sample Populations 
 
 
Description 
 
The Wilcoxon Rank Sum (Dovich, 1988) test is a non-parametric test used to test 
for variation in dispersion and location of the median between two populations.  As the 
differences in dispersion and means approaches zero, the two populations approach 
consensus.  In contrast to the typical “F” test for equivalence, normality of the population 
distributions is irrelevant because the Wilcoxon Rank Sum test is non-parametric. 
 
The hypotheses for the test are: 
H0:  The two populations have equal dispersions 
H1:  The two populations have unequal dispersions 
 
This illustrated example uses the actual data from the 3rd and 4th rounds of inquiry (see 
Tables 3 and 4).  The test is conducted by ranking the response means from both 
populations from 1 to (n3+n4) where n3 is the number of response means in the Round 3 
inquiry, and n4 is the number of response means in the Round 4 inquiry.  The resultant 
ranking is illustrated in Table H.1.  Where two scores are tied for rank, the rank is split 
between the two ties (example, 5th & 6th rank).  W3 and W4 are the sum of rank for each 
Round 3 and 4 respectively. 
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Table H.1 
 
Ranking of the Means for the Importance Ratings for All Practices in the Third and 
Fourth Rounds of Inquiry. 
Round Mean 
Combined 
Rank Round Mean 
Combined 
Rank 
4 4.089 1 
3 4.107 2 
3 4.125 3 
3 4.161 4 
3 4.179 5.5 
4 4.179 5.5 
4 4.204 7 
4 4.218 8 
3 4.333 9.5 
4 4.333 9.5 
3 4.357 11 
4 4.386 12 
3 4.429 13.5 
4 4.429 13.5 
3 4.481 15 
4 4.483 16 
4 4.517 17 
4 4.519 18 
4 4.607 19.5 
3 4.607 19.5 
3 4.643 21 
4 4.661 22 
3 4.679 23 
3 4.704 24 
4 4.724 25 
3 4.750 26 
4 4.768 27.5 
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Round Mean 
Combined 
Rank Round Mean 
Combined 
Rank 
3 4.786 27.5 
4 4.789 29.5 
4 4.789 29.5 
3 4.821 31 
3 4.857 32 
4 4.868 33 
3 4.926 34 
4 4.948 35 
3 4.964 36 
W4=Sum of Ranks = 328.5 W3=Sum of Ranks = 337.5 
 
 
The Z-score is calculated by: 
 
Z  =  [W – (n1)(n1+n2+1)/2] / [(n1)(n2)(n1+n2+1)/12]½ 
 
  = [337.5 – (18)(18+18+1)/2] / [(18)(18)(18+18+1)/12]½ 
 
  = -0.142360 
 
The test value for α = 0.05 using the standard normal probability density distribution (Z 
values) is +/- 1.96.  Since the calculated test value is in this range, the null hypothesis is 
accepted.  It is concluded that the two dispersions are equal and the 3rd and 4th rounds of 
inquiry are in consensus.  The reported p-value would be 0.8051. 
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